When I returned, I found my bed on sale in the market
As Sudan’s war enters its third year, the city of Al-Jenaynah, the capital of West Darfur, bears little resemblance in spirit or form to the place it was before the conflict erupted in April 2023. The city is undergoing profound, nay, radical transformation.
In the war’s early months, about 11 of Jenaynah’s 22 neighbourhoods saw mass displacement. Most residents fled to camps in eastern Chad, which borders the state, or to the cities of Al-Fasher and Nyala. Government and banking institutions were burned, civilians endured a strict siege, and medical and food aid convoys were barred entry.
Local sources who spoke with Atar, said the hardest-hit neighbourhoods were Al-Thawra, Al-Zuhur, Al-Tadamun, Al-Jamarik, Al-Mansoura, Al-Madaris and parts of Al-Jabal, areas in the city’s southern and western sectors.
A limited wave of returnees has since trickled back from eastern Chad in the wake of slight improvements in security. Yet many face a harsh reality: their homes are now occupied by newcomers, most bolstered and protected by the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which has controlled the city since the killing of former governor Khamis Abkar on June 14, 2023.
The images show some neighbourhoods in Al-Jenaynah in 2023 (Left) and the same neighbourhoods in 2025 (Right).
Returnees seeking to reclaim property have met violent resistance as there are no formal mechanisms to resolve ownership or restitution claims. Sources say returnees face threats of arrest or death if they press their claims, and some have been physically assaulted.
One woman from Al-Jenaynah, who fled to Chad, told Atar that as attacks on homes intensified, she wrapped her gold jewelry in heavy cloth and hid it in her bedpost.
“When I returned, I found my bed on sale in the market. I told the seller it belonged to me. As voices rose, a market committee member, formed during the war, asked for proof. I retrieved what I had hidden, and the committee returned all my stolen furniture,” she said.
But she was among the lucky ones.
Ishaq, a pseudonym Atar uses for security reasons, and other displaced residents of the Ardamata area northeast of Al-Jenaynah, told Atar that some returning families found strangers living in their homes. Many gave up and returned to the Adré camp in Chad after learning that those who tried to repossess their houses were beaten or arrested on trumped-up charges of collaborating with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) or labeled remnants of the previous regime.
Another woman recounted returning from Chad to retrieve belongings she had buried in her house before fleeing.
Like many Al-Jenaynah homes, hers had been rented out by a new occupant who claimed to have bought it from someone else.
“They insisted I petition the new owner before digging,” she said.
She appealed to ad hoc committees set up to settle such disputes and, in the presence of the occupier, was allowed to excavate. She recovered her items, but both the occupier and his tenant took a share before letting her keep the rest.
Over the past two years, RSF and allied Arab militias have demolished much of the city’s infrastructure, carried out widespread looting, burned and flattened residential districts, especially those inhabited by the Masalit community, and razed camps like Abu Zarr, Al-Hajj, Krinding and the university compound, burying them under heavy machinery and sand, an Al-Thawra resident told Atar.
Patterns of Resettlement
Since RSF seized Al-Jenaynah, settlement patterns have taken on new ethnic and economic dimensions. Pro-RSF residents returned to others’ homes, looted, occupied, then sold or rented to others, while some Arab tribes used force to occupy houses abandoned by families in Chad.
“Thieves stole everything: furniture, vehicles, livestock, even zinc roofing, doors and windows. Much of it was sold cheaply in markets or taken to nearby villages and into Sudan’s border regions with Chad,” Muhammad Hasan (not real name), an eyewitness, told Atar.
Muhammad Osman (an alias), Al-Jenaynah resident, describes today’s rental market as nonexistent.
“Housing is overrun by people who arrived from South and North Darfur, Khartoum or Al-Jazeera states and the ongoing waves of displacement. Residences are also full because pro-RSF groups and thieves have seized entire neighbourhoods,” he said.
Looting extended beyond homes.
Jamal Khamis, a resident, told Atar how someone seized his kiosk inside Al-Jenaynah hospital and then subleased it.
important heritage sites and institutions in Jabal al-Ameer, Al-Junaynah
Ahmad Adam (not real name), another resident, says it is RSF elements, allied militias, members of the so-called civil administration, government or Arab groups who are buying prime real estate properties in historic districts like Al-Madaris, Al-Jamarik and Al-Tadamun.
Fear and dominance have driven some Masalit people to sell their land and businesses to these new power brokers.
One report indicates that Abd al-Rahman Bahr al-Din, a brother of the Masalit Sultan and currently residing in Egypt, sold shops he owns in Al-Junaynah to influential Arab groups.
In a drive to erase Al-Jenaynah’s cultural identity, an exiled Masalit resident tells Atar that heritage sites such as Sultan Bahr al-Din’s Museum have been demolished or looted, administrative institutions dismantled and historical documents referencing the Dar Sultanate stolen. Witnesses from neighbourhoods around the museum recall RSF snipers inside the building during heavy fighting on April 26, and soldiers emerging with artifacts stolen from its galleries.
They also report that the homes of the sultan and his relatives, rich in historical heirlooms, were ransacked.
Civil Administration: Shifts in the Balance of Power
Two years into the war, West Darfur’s social and security order has flipped. Arab groups find themselves in positions of strength. The RSF and its “civil administration,” backed by allied traditional authorities, now exert fresh forms of control over every aspect of Al-Jenaynah, even though a government-appointed governor resides in Port Sudan.
From its base in Al-Jenaynah, the civil administration, led by El-Tijani Karshum, an Arab who was deputy to the slain governor Khamis Abkar before RSF appointed him governor, later retitling his position as head of civil administration, oversees relations with local and international NGOs.
A local source told Atar that the administration, in collusion with former officials and land speculators, manages settlement, land grabs and property sales or rentals. In many cases, homes have been altered to prevent former owners from reclaiming them.
Traditional authorities, restructured under the civil administration, are split. Some tribal leaders have sided with the de facto power, motivated by fear or greed while others, like Masalit chiefs, have resisted.
A new economic reality is being cemented—one based on dispossession, protection, and power, not production or trade.
“West Darfur is home to a range of ethnic groups beyond the Masalit, including the Birno, Birgo, Aranga, Hausa, Koma, Tama, and Zaghawa. Since the RSF took control, Arab tribes such as the Rizeigat Mahariya, Awlad Mana, Awlad Zaid, Awlad Rashid, Al-Shatiya, Al-Salamat, and Beni Halba have come to dominate the civil administration. This has occurred despite only token representation for non-Arab communities like the Koma, Fur, and even the Masalit,” said an activist from Al-Jenaynah, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Following recent unrest in Khartoum, Al-Jazirah and Kordofan states, many RSF fighters, allied militia families and Arab civilians accused of collaborating with the SAF, have settled in Al-Jenaynah, buying or renting homes vacated in the war’s fallout.
Today, Al-Jenaynah is marked by intense caution and fragility.
As Muhammad Hasan, a resident, observed, the civil administration is keen to portray Arab groups as detached from the atrocities visited on non-Arab communities.
“On the surface, there is peace, but non-Arab residents, especially the Masalit, live in deep fear and dread any new conflict that might lead to fresh tragedy,” Muhammad told Atar.
Incoming and outgoing goods
Border Towns close to Al-Junaynah
Omar Mohamed (not real name), a foodstuff trader in Al-Jenaynah’s market, tells Atar that most commodities enter through West Darfur’s crossings and border points. These goods arrive at AlJenaynah’s market and are then distributed to other Darfur states. Security deterioration and blocked roads between Darfur and the states of central, northern, and eastern Sudan crippled commerce throughout the wartime.
Current commercial activity, however, differs significantly from what it was before April 2023. New economic frameworks defined by war conditions, and led by actors wielding capital and influence, have emerged. Today’s market scene carries a dual meaning: on one hand, it signals life’s persistence despite destruction; on the other, it reflects novel shifts in resource distribution and economic power within the city.
The new economic landscape in West Darfur is shaped by open borders with Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. These borders, long natural passages for goods and cross-border trade and meeting points for merchants from West African countries like Niger, Nigeria, and Mali have become, in the midst of the fierce war, the primary lifeline sustaining minimal economic activity in a region where state institutions are eroding, official systems are collapsing, and everything is in constant flux.
Jamal Abkar, a pseudonym for a trader operating between Chad and West Darfur, says that items such as fuel, soap, and foodstuffs as well as building materials (iron and lumber), used clothing, and mobile phones are smuggled into Al-Jenaynah’s market via Libya’s Kufra; Al-Tina and Adré on the Chad border, Foro Baranga, known for livestock trade; and Um Dukhn and Um Dafuq on the fringes of the Central African Republic.
At all these border points, informal levy stations have replaced customs checkpoints, imposing fees ranging from 20,000 to 100,000 Sudanese Pounds on small vehicles and traditional transport modes like tuk-tuks and carts, while large trucks pay between 1.5 million and 6 million Sudanese Pounds or their equivalent in Chadian Francs. The absence of state authority and the spread of militias and gangs have also fuelled a burgeoning arms-smuggling market.
Idris Hassan (a pseudonym for a trader in Al-Jenaynah’s market) says the RSF and its civilian administrations diverted exports of livestock, gum Arabic, and crops to Chad instead of shipping them to eastern and northern Sudan’s crossings and ports. This shift boosted border trade hubs like Foro Baranga and gave rise to new companies, business groups, and merchants who previously were unemployed or worked in marginal jobs.
Chadian Franc: Border Currency
The widespread use of the Chadian franc in Al-Jenaynah’s markets and environs has become one of the most striking features of West Sudan’s economic transformation, owing to the deep economic and social intertwinement with neighbouring Chad. As the Sudanese Pound continued to collapse against the dollar, residents and traders adopted the Chadian Franc as their principal medium of daily transactions amid severe scarcity of Sudanese currency and the circulation of counterfeit notes permitted by the RSF authorities.
Fluctuations in the Franc’s exchange rate against the dollar have triggered sharp price swings within the state’s markets, heightening economic uncertainty and directly impacting residents’ lives, especially displaced people who lost their savings and sources of income and now face a new reality that forces them to use a foreign currency they neither hold nor control.
“The Chadian Franc has become the dominant currency in the state, and its higher value compared to the Sudanese Pound drives up prices, especially given the volatile exchange rate between the two. Currently, one franc is worth twice a Sudanese pound, whereas two months ago it was about 1,800 pounds. This constant change directly affects commodity pricing, since goods are imported in francs and sold in pounds, making prices subject to ongoing fluctuation,” a food trader in Al-Jenaynah told Atar.
The trader, who asked for anonymity, said residents and traders now prefer transacting in the Chadian Franc due to its higher value and its deep link to import-export flows across western borders, particularly through the Adré, Um Dukhn, Foro Baranga, Qoz Beida, Al-Tina, and Um Dafuq crossings. This dependence creates price disparities between regions based on proximity to the border and the stability of the franc exchange rate.
Fuel, armaments, and tribal influence
Libyan fuel is smuggled into West Sudan via two main routes within a complex network that links Libya to Chad and then to Sudan. The first route begins in the Kouri Bougoudi border area between Libya and Chad, then proceeds eastward through a long corridor passing Abéché in eastern Chad before reaching the Sudanese border at Adré. From there, it travels to Al-Jenaynah through Adikong in West Darfur. At that point, fuel is transported using tuk-tuks, carts, or Toyota Land Cruisers with capacities ranging from 14 to 17 drums before being distributed to Nyala, Zalingei, and Al-Da’ein.
The second route starts in Kufra, southern Libya, and goes to Um Jarass in northern Chad, then to the Al-Tina crossing, and finally to Al-Jenaynah via Adré. There, fuel is moved in Libyan tankers.
Our source speaks of the high risks along these corridors, noting they are also used to transport military equipment for the RSF and various logistical supplies from regions like Um Jaras. He recalls an incident in late April when three large trucks were looted, resulting in the deaths of a woman and her daughter.
He says Arab groups in Al-Jenaynah, backed by RSF protection and cross-border connections, now control these vital economic corridors. They were traditionally managed by traders from the Zaghawa and Gouran ethnicities operating between Sudan and Chad.
Death of Agriculture
Agriculture has disappeared from most lands southwest of Al-Jenaynah due to population displacement.
On the production side, agriculture was crushed under the weight of war. Military operations extended into farmlands; farmers faced looting and violence, and militias seized supply routes, making seeds, fertilizer, and fuel inaccessible. Agricultural seasons collapsed in 2023 and 2024, food production plummeted, and residents relied increasingly on aid amid growing fear of resuming farming.
“Agriculture has disappeared from most lands southwest of Al-Jenaynah due to population displacement. If these lands are not cultivated, they may turn to desert, or other herders and farmers may exploit them, meaning entire communities like the Masalit lose their productive role,” Hassan Khalid, (a pseudonym for a farmer from Al-Jabal neighbourhood in Al-Jenaynah told Atar.
Mohamed, another farmer from the region, adds:
“The 2023 season was one of the worst due to insecurity, funding interruptions, and lack of inputs. With climate change and militia expansion, conditions worsened in 2024 and 2025, leading to a sharp decline in production and skyrocketing crop prices.”
