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On the Frontline: Ad-Dalanj pays the rice for shifting alliances

Since the outbreak of the 2011 war, locally known in South Kordofan as the Six-Six War, in reference to its eruption on June 6, armed clashes have persisted between the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N, al-Hilu faction) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), then aligned with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The war has known no true lull, save for brief ceasefires that have repeatedly collapsed, only to give way to renewed fighting.

In the April 15, 2023 war, the town of Ad-Dalanj became a casualty of contradicting alliances, both declared and clandestine, among three actors: the SAF, the SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and the RSF.

Prior to the eruption of the war between SAF and RSF, al-Hilu’s SPLM-N forces controlled all territories west of Ad-Dalanj in South Kordofan. With the outbreak of the latest conflict, the SPLM-N refrained from siding with either warring faction, instead intensifying military operations against both. This stance continued until February 2025, when SPLM-N entered into a political pact with the RSF, soon followed by military coordination.

In June 2023, SPLM-N forces began launching attacks near SAF-controlled areas. On June 21, coinciding with the expiry of a three-day ceasefire between SAF and RSF, Ad-Dalanj awoke to the sound of artillery and explosions. A unit attributed to SPLM-N had attacked the headquarters of the 54th Brigade, though it remains unconfirmed whether this unit was officially under al-Hilu’s command. That day, the town’s marketplace was closed, and residents took shelter in their homes.

A similar pattern unfolded on July 14, when SPLM-N shelled areas southwest of Ad-Dalanj, prompting retaliatory shelling from the army. The next day, SPLM-N seized the SAF’s military camp in Al-Kurgul, located on the main road linking Ad-Dalanj to the state capital, Kadugli, effectively severing the national route between the two towns. Four days later, the SAF spokesperson announced the army had repelled an SPLM-N assault on Al-Kurgul.

These military escalations sparked intercommunal tension that exploded on October 27, 2023, when violent clashes broke out in Abu Zaid neighbourhood between armed members of the Nuba and Hawazma tribes. Civilians were killed, numerous homes were torched, and the army intervened to contain the fighting. However, violence between the Nuba and Hawazma persisted, prompting thousands from the Hawazma to flee Ad-Dalanj for Ad-Dibeebat.

At that time, Sheria, the RSF commander in South Kordofan, mobilized Hawazma youth to attack Ad-Dalanj, selecting al-Ruweikeiba as a rallying point for new RSF recruits. On December 4, 2023, Sheria convened a meeting with the traditional leadership of the Hawazma tribes at the Awlad Badr farm, near Tayba Bridge on the road between Ad-Dibeebat and Ad-Dalanj. Attendees included Prince Al-Hadi Mohamed Hamad Asosa, as well as local chieftains Bukhari, Malik Dras, and Mohameddani Habila.

Despite the absence of an officially declared alliance, the coordination on the battlefield strongly suggested an undeclared military pact between SAF and SPLM-N/al-Hilu.

By late 2023, Ad-Dalanj had become completely cut off from the rest of the country. The SPLM-N controlled both Al-Kurgul and Hajar Jawad, effectively closing the road to Kadugli. It also held al-Kadar in the northwest, and Karkaraya and al-Takma to the east. Meanwhile, the route to Al-Obeid, capital of North Kordofan, had long been severed following RSF’s seizure of Ad-Dibeebat.

At year’s end, an RSF convoy led by Sheria moved from Ad-Dibeebat in 12 combat vehicles to Nayla, where it joined forces with another RSF unit led by Makin al-Sadiq, comprising 13 vehicles. Together, the two forces advanced toward Habila, about 50 kilometres east of Ad-Dalanj.

On January 4, 2024, the RSF released video footage declaring their control over government buildings and the main market in Habila. It is believed the attack had taken place earlier, on December 31, 2023, but a nationwide Internet blackout delayed the news from surfacing.

Clashes between SPLM-N and RSF had already commenced on December 5, 2023, when RSF units attacked al-Takma, located just 7 kilometres east of Ad-Dalanj. SPLM-N forces stationed there repelled the attack, which RSF attempted to repeat the following day, triggering a wave of displacement toward Karkaraya and Ad-Dalanj itself.

Map showing Ad-Dalanj and surrounding conflict zones

In January 2024, SPLM-N units entered Ad-Dalanj proper, taking control of all city entrances and the al-Tomats neighbourhoods, while SAF forces remained confined within the military garrison. SPLM-N leaders in Ad-Dalanj held meetings with tribal authorities and residents, aiming to negotiate a peaceful handover of the garrison without bloodshed.

During these talks, SPLM-N proposed that community leaders deliver a message to the SAF’s 54th Brigade: the SPLM-N had no interest in direct confrontation within the city. They offered SAF troops a corridor to withdraw toward Kadugli or, alternatively, to remain under SPLM-N command if they chose to join the movement.

 

However, on the morning of January 8, 2024, RSF launched a surprise attack on Dilling with 60 combat vehicles. The assault was repelled through joint resistance by the 54th Brigade, SPLM-N units, and Nuba popular forces. Despite the absence of an officially declared alliance, the coordination on the battlefield strongly suggested an undeclared military pact between SAF and SPLM-N. The RSF was pushed back to Ad-Dibeebat, leaving Dilling under joint control of the army and SPLM-N.

These battles brought public life in Ad-Dalanj to a halt. Markets and medical facilities were shuttered, and widespread displacement turned the town into a ghost city. Authorities warned residents against abandoning their homes, fearing looting. Homes in the neighbourhoods of al-Qoz, al-Matar, and Abu Zaid—predominantly inhabited by the Hawazma, were torched.

At the time, the Sudanese government’s official media platform released a statement claiming that SAF and SPLM-N forces under Abdelaziz al-Hilu had jointly repelled the RSF’s “vicious” attack on Ad-Dalanj and subsequently pursued RSF remnants in nearby districts. SPLM-N did not issue a public statement, and later denied any formal coordination.

Back in September 2023, following a meeting in Eritrea between Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and al-Hilu, the Sovereign Council Chairman proposed that SPLM-N fight alongside the Sudanese army in exchange for political concessions, chiefly on the issue of secularism.

Following the January battle, SPLM-N forces did not withdraw to their previous positions east and west of Ad-Dalanj, but remained inside the city. Units eventually reached deeper into al-Ttomat, with intentions to secure full control of Ad-Dalanj without clashing with the 54th Brigade. By late February, SPLM-N temporarily pulled back, allowing SAF officers to deliberate. However, the garrison refused to withdraw.

Amid the three-way conflict, civilian suffering deepened. On February 20, SAF bombed a school in al-Hadra, South Kordofan, killing 11 schoolgirls and several teachers. Meanwhile, SPLM-N continued besieging the city.

From mid-May 2024 onward, conditions deteriorated drastically. The price of basic commodities, especially sorghum, the population’s dietary staple, quadrupled. A sack of sorghum soared to SDG 30,000 due to the failure of the agricultural season. Most of the region’s inhabitants depend on farming for their livelihood. Habila, east of Ad-Dalanj and a vital agricultural centre, descended into a state of lawlessness.

In addition to rising prices, signs of severe shortages in key goods and physical currency (cash) began to emerge. Trade routes had collapsed, and the movement of goods from areas like Souq al-Ni’am on the South Sudanese border and Umm Jamina in West Kordofan ground to a halt.

In July 2024, the Humanitarian Aid Commission in Ad-Dalanj locality prepared a report on the conditions of displaced people, indicating that around 41,132 internally displaced persons had arrived in the city since April 15, 2023, in addition to others who had been residing there since 2011.

The Nutrition Department in Ad-Dalanj, South Kordofan State, recorded 6.126 cases of child malnutrition following a field survey across local health centers. The distribution was 90 per cent normal, 7 per cent moderate, and 3 per cent severe malnutrition. The survey covered 12 health centres in the town: Albok, Al-Safa, Al-Wadi, Al-Tomat, Al-Taqana, Al-Mustashfa, Al-Marafeet, Al-Tokma, Al-Hilla Al-Jadida, Al-Jama’a, and See-Es. The Al-Tomat Centre recorded the highest figures with 3.775 normal cases, 101 moderate, and 38 severe.

Meanwhile, negotiations were underway between the Sudanese government and SPLM-N to halt hostilities and allow humanitarian aid access to South Kordofan.

On May 13, 2024, South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit met with Sovereign Council member Shams al-Din al-Kabbashi, who had previously met SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu, in preparation to sign an agreement to facilitate urgent humanitarian aid delivery within a week. However, talks stalled. On July 30, following the failure of negotiations, SPLM-N launched an attack on Ad-Dalanj, which the Sudanese army repelled, attempting to lift the siege by striking SPLM-N positions in Karkaraya.

On October 10, 2024, an internationally mediated agreement was reached among the three parties, the army, SPLM-N, and the RSF, to allow the entry and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian aid throughout the state. Aid trucks subsequently reached six areas in South Kordofan, carrying medicine, milk, and biscuits for malnourished children. These included two areas under the control of the army (Ad-Dalanj and Kadugli), two under SPLM-N (Hajar Jawad and Al-Kurgul), and two under RSF control (Al-Hammadi and Ad-Dibeebat).

By late December, Ad-Dalanj witnessed widespread protests by Sudanese certificate students who took to the streets peacefully after not receiving their seating numbers and exam papers. Their march started in the city centre, passed through the market, and reached both the security and intelligence office and the executive manager’s office, who addressed them and promised they would sit the exams with the next batch. At that point, SPLM-N clarified that the exams had arrived from Juba to Kadugli, but the government had rejected a proposal to allow the NGO Smarten Pearce to transport them through SPLM-N-controlled areas, citing concerns over nationwide exam security. The governor insisted on escort by army, police, and security personnel.

The ultimate goal is to create one unified army that protects the emerging authority.

Chattigo Amoja Dalman, SPLM-N media official

On December 30, just days after the exams began, SPLM-N accused the Sudanese army of dropping military supplies in Kadugli on December 29, an alleged breach of the humanitarian aid agreement. SPLM-N said a cargo plane had flown over the area and dropped supplies, though under the agreement, aid was to be delivered via Kadugli Airport and airdropped in the Jald region. The group accused the government of exploiting the aid corridor to deploy military logistics. SPLM-N also accused the army of attacking Abu Seiba, an area under their control, even though both sides had agreed to extend the aid delivery deal.

The new year began with more mutual accusations and escalating military and political developments. On January 14, 2025, SPLM-N accused the army of attacking their positions in Karkaraya and Hajer Jawad, a breach of the aid delivery deal, according to SPLM-N spokesperson Sana Philip Matar.

A month later, SPLM-N shelled Kadugli, killing 44 civilians and injuring 28 others. On February 13, the 54th Infantry Division’s military compound in Ad-Dalanj was shelled during a ceremonial drill. The army responded with a counterattack, reclaiming Karkaraya and Hajar Jawad, both containing oil stations.

On February 19, SPLM-N leader Abdelaziz al-Hilu appeared alongside several politicians and leaders of armed factions, including RSF representatives, at the Kenyatta International Convention Centre in Nairobi, Kenya, in what became known as the Nairobi Conference. The aim was to sign a charter to establish a parallel government in Sudan in partnership with RSF, effectively ending any prospect of an alliance between SPLM-N and the Sudanese army.

On February 24, the Sudanese army reopened the road between Ad-Dalanj and Kadugli by linking the 54th Brigade in Ad-Dalanj with the 14th Division in Kadugli at the Al-Samasim area, effectively lifting SPLM-N’s siege on both towns.

In a statement to Beam Reports, SPLM-N declared that the armed groups signatory to the Nairobi Charter alongside RSF aimed to develop it into a full-fledged military-security agreement. SPLM-N’s media official, Chattigo Amoja Dalman, said the document stipulated the formation of a single professional national army. While integrating the signatories would take time, he stated, “the ultimate goal is to create one unified army that protects the emerging authority.” He also noted a transition from a defensive to an offensive military posture, predicting fierce battles in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.

Though the Nairobi Charter was initially marketed as a political agreement, its military implications became immediately apparent. On March 26, the allied SPLM-N and RSF forces captured the town of Lagawa. On April 3, they took control of the Khor al-Dalib area, previously secured by the Sudanese army during the opening of the Ad-Dalanj–Kadugli road. The latter soon regained the territory, but less than a month after reopening the road, RSF and its new ally launched a joint attack on Umm Adara on April 12, severing the link between Ad-Dalanj and Kadugli and the Souq al-Ni’am market in South Sudan, a critical source of goods for the towns. The result was soaring prices and severe food shortages. In a widely circulated speech on May 30, RSF deputy commander Abdul Rahim Dagalo announced that their coalition was now fighting side by side with RSF forces.

Ad-Dalanj’s tragic journey through Sudan’s shifting warfronts underscores the devastating toll of fractured alliances and militarized politics on civilian life.

On the morning of Saturday, June 20, Ad-Dalanj came under artillery fire from SPLM-N positions in Al-Hujairat to the west, and Al-Kidr to the northwest. Artillery exchanges occurred between SPLM-N and the Sudanese army on the city’s outskirts, while fighting continued in areas including Al-Dushul, Al-Taqatu’, and Kiega since June 17.

Life began to return to normal on Sunday morning, June 21. Markets reopened, and Starlink Internet services resumed, but a sense of unease persisted due to ongoing security threats and the general fragility of the situation.

Despite the continued siege on the city, goods still arrived via alternative routes, one from Al-Obied that avoids RSF-controlled Ad-Dibeebat, and another supply line from the town of Al-Khiwai via merchants from the Hamar tribe, who make three-day commercial trips using tuk-tuks.

On June 28, the Sudanese army regained control of Al-Dushul in South Kordofan after fierce battles with SPLM-N. Just a day later, Sudanese exam papers finally reached Ad-Dalanj.

Ad-Dalanj’s tragic journey through Sudan’s shifting warfronts underscores the devastating toll of fractured alliances and militarized politics on civilian life. As the SPLM-N/al-Hilu faction, RSF, and SAF vied for territorial and political dominance, the town became a battleground not only for military control but for the survival of its residents. Repeated sieges, clashes, and political betrayals shattered livelihoods, displaced thousands, and crippled basic services. While temporary ceasefires and aid corridors offered brief reprieves, they were quickly undone by renewed violence. Today, Ad-Dalanj stands as a stark reminder of the human cost of protracted conflict and the urgent need for a sustainable political resolution in South Kordofan.

Map showing the warring factions movement zones in South Kordofan

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