In July, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in the Blue Nile Region announced its plan to cultivate 4.5 million feddans during the summer agricultural season. The statement came at a time when farmers in the rainfed sector of the region were still awaiting financial support to seize the season—one they had welcomed with cautious optimism due to what many described as “promising” rainfall in parts of the area. Yet, optimism has given way to disillusionment as financial hardship forces many farmers to abandon their land, allowing perennial weeds to take root in fields once earmarked for cultivation. Rising costs and dwindling resources have turned agriculture into a prohibitively expensive venture.
Due to a combination of limited financial capacity, a lack of support from banking institutions, and, in some areas, the looting of farmers’ assets by Rapid Support Forces (RSF)—particularly in large swaths of the Al-Tadamun locality—the area planted this season has reportedly shrunk to just a quarter of the originally prepared lands, according to farmers who spoke to Atar. The situation is only marginally better in areas not directly affected by RSF presence. In localities such as Eastern and Western Agadi, Ar-Roseires, and others, many farmers have been forced to reduce the size of their cultivated lands due to a lack of capital, often choosing to grow only select crops. This has disrupted food supply chains and altered the region’s crop composition, creating gaps in the production of key staples.
Broken Preparations
Insolvency has become the norm.
Ali Ismail, farmer in Eastern Agadi
Speaking to Atar, Ali Ismail, a farmer working in the Eastern Agadi rainfed agricultural schemes in the Blue Nile Region, explained why he had abandoned seeking funding from banks, citing what he called “cumbersome procedures” and the delayed disbursement of loans. Ismail said that last year; despite applying for financing in June, he didn’t receive funds and agricultural inputs until November—by which point his crops were already near harvest. He noted that the absence of agricultural insurance companies—ones that could help mitigate losses from natural disasters or pests—has also driven farmers away from bank financing.
Like many others in his area, Ismail has chosen to scale back his planting operations, relying solely on self-financing. The risk of default and subsequent legal action from banks, especially in light of delayed disbursements, has made reliance on credit untenable. “Insolvency has become the norm,” Ismail noted.
Despite having access to diesel—allocated through permits issued by the Ministry of Agriculture—farmers in both Eastern and Western Agadi continue to complain about soaring land preparation costs, which have nearly doubled. Ismail explained that preparing a jad‘a (a five-feddan plot) requires three to four passes using a disc harrow. Last season, one pass cost 40,000 SDG, but this season it has risen to 80,000 SDG—amounting to 320,000 SDG per plot.
Ideally, farmers should prepare their land with three passes to ensure optimal soil conditioning. But, under mounting financial strain, most are forced to settle for a single pass—a compromise that, according to an agricultural engineer who spoke to Atar, is the first step toward reduced crop yields. “Proper land preparation is essential to productivity,” the expert emphasized.
Farmers have also ceased relying on improved seeds, which were once provided by the government or international agencies. With distribution now virtually nonexistent, they have resorted to producing their own seed stock, despite its questionable quality.
Banks Fall Short as Farmers Wait in Vain
In May 2025, the Sudanese Agricultural Bank’s Blue Nile branch announced the launch of its financing program for the 2025 agricultural season. Ramadan Al-Samani Aqar, the bank’s regional director, described the initiative as “ambitious,” targeting more than two million feddans and earmarking over 30% of the total funding for smallholder farmers and returnees. However, government data indicates that even if the plan is fully implemented, the bank will still finance less than half the area targeted by regional authorities.
In reality, the outlook appears even bleaker. A source inside one of the banks involved in financing the Blue Nile agricultural sector told Atar that the institution failed to deliver even the first phase of funding—allocated for diesel fuel. Agricultural financing typically occurs in stages, beginning with support for land preparation and pesticide procurement. The source predicted that the shortfall would likely continue into the next phases, including capital financing and pesticide supply.
In previous seasons, three banks—the Agricultural Bank, Farmers Commercial Bank, and Omdurman National Bank—handled agricultural financing through a syndicated portfolio. Among them, the Agricultural Bank has been the main financier for both rainfed and traditional sectors. However, since last season, Omdurman National has ceased all agricultural lending, and this season, Farmers Commercial Bank has followed suit. Though the Agricultural Bank continues to make announcements about financing, large numbers of farmers have yet to receive any support.
Multiple sources within one of the region’s banks disclosed to Atar that the Agricultural Bank has failed to finance 400,000 feddans—its agreed-upon share of the region’s agricultural financing. Farmers remain in limbo, waiting for funds that may never come.
Inputs Available, but Prices Soar
A supplier of agricultural inputs in Ad-Damazin market told Atar that demand is extremely weak, limited mostly to smallholders purchasing minimal quantities—between 10 and 15 liters—of pesticides.
A field visit by an Atar correspondent to Ar-Roseires market revealed alarming spikes in input prices. Seed prices have surged from 1,600 SDG per kilo last season to 3,500 SDG this season. The price of a gallon of diesel has jumped from 11,000 SDG to 16,500 SDG. Farmers fear further increases as the value of the Sudanese pound continues to plummet, already triggering price hikes in neighboring states.
In a bid to ease the burden, Blue Nile Governor Lt. Gen. Ahmed Al-Omda Badi issued a decree exempting agricultural inputs from various taxes and fees. According to the official state news agency (SUNA), the exemption covers seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides, lifting transport fees, commercial goods taxes, local service fees, and weighing charges—all listed in the fiscal year 2025 budget annexes.
Yet, by late July—nearly two months after the bank’s initial announcement—hundreds of farmers and agricultural companies gathered in front of the Agricultural Bank’s headquarters in Ad-Damazin, demanding expedited disbursement. One farmer from Western Agadi who took part in the demonstration told Atar that the bank’s failure to provide meaningful financial support disproportionately harms smallholders. “The bank prioritizes large-scale farmers—those who depleted its capital and haven’t repaid their debts. Now it’s the small farmers who are being asked to carry the burden,” he said.
He added, “As we move into August, we simply wanted the bank to be honest—either tell us funding is coming, or it isn’t—so we can find our own way forward.”
Many Blue Nile farmers accuse the banks of favoritism toward major landowners and traders, giving them priority in access to financing. These traders, along with loan intermediaries, are accused of manipulating the system—selling diesel, fertilizers, and pesticides acquired through financing on the open market, or lending them at exorbitant interest rates to unfinanced farmers for the initial stages of cultivation.
Dhu-Noon Himidan Babikir, a farmer in Wad Al-Mahi locality, told Atar he personally knows several well-connected traders who receive large amounts of agricultural funding despite having no active farms. “They receive preferential treatment and generous credit, then resell the inputs in the market or lend them at high profit margins at the end of the season,” he said.
Token Financing and a Lapse in Oversight
Agricultural expert Musab Mohammed Al-Hadi, known locally as “At-Tikina,” told Atar that the Agricultural Bank’s current financing model is insufficient and fails to make any real impact. He asserted that rainfed agriculture in particular remains critically underfunded, noting that while the bank does provide diesel and Salam financing (Islamic pre-harvest contract financing), the support only covers a fraction of the sector’s vast operational needs.
“Even with financing, a farmer can’t fully prepare their land,” At-Tikina said. “They can’t afford herbicides or fertilizers, nor can they carry out essential weeding.” The result, he explained, is chronically low yields and shrinking incomes—pushing rainfed farmers further into poverty and a continuous cycle of economic deterioration.
What we currently have is symbolic funding. What we need is production-oriented financing.
agricultural expert Musab Mohammed Al-Hadi (“At-Tikina”)
One of the key structural issues, At-Tikina noted, is what he called a “gap in oversight.” He described how non-farmers often obtain financing—securing diesel, fertilizers, and pesticides—which they resell on the open market rather than using for agricultural production. This diversion of resources, he said, amounts to financing that fails to translate into national output.
At-Tikina urged for a more holistic and substantial financing approach—one that covers the full chain of agricultural activity: land tilling, seeds, both organic and chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and even manual labor costs, right through to post-harvest transport. “What we currently have is symbolic funding,” he said. “What we need is production-oriented financing.” Without such a transformation, he warned, trust between real farmers and financial institutions will continue to erode.
A farmer from Eastern Agadi echoed this sentiment, telling Atar that although rainfall was favorable in August, most farmers began planting using their own limited resources because the Agricultural Bank had failed to deliver. As of early August, the bank had only funded about 50 farmers out of thousands of applicants—and even those were primarily large-scale landowners. “The rest of us got nothing,” he said.
Despite these challenges, some land has been cultivated through self-financing or partnerships between farmers and private companies. The Agricultural Bank, he explained, allocates just 20 barrels of diesel per 1,000 feddans—often far from adequate—forcing many farmers to turn to the market to make up the shortfall.
From Western Agadi, farmer Saeed Idris Musa lamented what he sees as government neglect. “Instead of supporting us, the authorities impose taxes, levies, and endless fees.” He detailed several charges, including an annual “land lease renewal fee,” taxes on the transport of fuel from urban centers to farming areas, and a land tax levied by the Blue Nile Region’s agricultural administration that ranges between 4,000 and 5,000 SDG per feddan.
Return from Displacement—Met with Broken Promises
There’s no sign of agriculture here, the farmers themselves are gone.
farmer Dawood Adam Tartar, Quli
Hameed Adam Salmoon, a farmer from Roro in Al-Tadamun locality, was displaced during the RSF’s occupation of Boot, Quli, Al-Ahmar, Roro, and Jirewa. Speaking to Atar, he painted a bleak picture of the post-conflict agricultural landscape: “There’s no farming activity like there used to be. The RSF looted everything—our tractors, our harvest, and they burned down our storage facilities.”
While some farmers have since “summoned the courage to return,” Salmoon said they came back to find everything destroyed. With no support from the government—or any other body—many have given up farming altogether and relocated. Without resources or external assistance, returning farmers are losing their only chance to reclaim the only livelihood they’ve ever known.
In Quli, also in Al-Tadamun, farmer Dawood Adam Tartar described an equally dire situation. “There’s no sign of agriculture here,” he told Atar. “The farmers themselves are gone.”
Similarly, Salah Abdul-Sadiq Koko, who returned from displacement along the Sudan-Ethiopia border, said, “We can’t afford to cultivate even a single feddan. Everything we owned has been stolen. No one is helping, and we’re tired of empty promises.” Koko predicted the failure of this season’s harvest, citing widespread displacement following the RSF’s occupation of the area. He noted that very few displaced farmers have returned to Quli, largely due to ongoing insecurity.
The region remains plagued by inter-communal tensions—many of which trace back to the RSF’s occupation. Certain ethnic communities now accuse others of collaborating with the RSF, exacerbating mistrust and slowing the return of displaced populations, especially farmers. As long as insecurity persists, the number of returnees is expected to dwindle further.
The western region of Blue Nile—home to the region’s most fertile and productive agricultural lands—faces its own set of logistical challenges. Heavy rainfall has severed the only road connecting it to the regional capital, Ad-Damazin. The absence of an agricultural bank in the area forces farmers to travel to Ad-Damazin for any banking services—an impossible journey during the rainy season, particularly in July and August, when the roads become completely impassable.
Even in previous, more stable years, only a small percentage of farmers in the western region received bank financing, a local farmer told Atar. “This year, there has been no financing at all—and no one is even interested anymore,” he added. “The nearest bank is in Ad-Damazin. How are we supposed to reach it when the roads are completely closed due to rains?”
The fact that people are turning to farming small plots around villages is a clear indicator of the crisis facing large agricultural projects.
resident of Wad Al-Mahi
A Ray of Light: The 'Jabareek'
Amid these bleak circumstances, there remains a flicker of hope in the form of smallholder plots known locally as Jabareek and al-biladat—modest pieces of land farmed by rural families in and around their villages. These plots, though limited in scale, have become the focus of aid efforts by local, regional, and international NGOs, which are distributing free sorghum and sesame seeds to smallholder farmers, displaced families, and returnees.
In a field visit by an Atar correspondent, a notable surge in activity was observed around these small community-based plots, as economic hardship and the absence of large-scale financing have pushed farmers to shift focus to land within or near their residential areas.
A resident of Wad Al-Mahi told Atar, “The fact that people are turning to farming small plots around villages is a clear indicator of the crisis facing large agricultural projects.” He added that while these smallholdings can meet local consumption needs, they are no substitute for the major farming schemes that contribute significantly to the national economy.
