On October 6, the Board of Directors of Sudan Cotton Company Ltd. issued a decision appointing Lt. Gen. Abu Bakr Hassan Mustafa Dambalab—former Director of the General Intelligence Service—as Managing Director of the company. The appointment was made pursuant to Article (1/57) of the 2015 Companies Act and Article (67) of the Company’s Articles of Association. According to the Board, the move is part of a broader reform and restructuring plan for a company grappling with deep administrative and economic challenges.
Information obtained by Atar reveals that Sudan Cotton Company is a limited corporation registered under the 1925 Companies Act with Certificate of Incorporation No. 3223. The company engages in cotton cultivation and financing. Farmers of Al-Jazirah and Al-Managil Scheme hold 39.1% of its shares, while Ar-Rahad Scheme farmers own 16.4%, and Halfa Scheme farmers another 16.4%. The National Pension Fund holds 14.5%, and Farmers’ Commercial Bank holds 13.6%. Taken together, farmers control roughly 71% of the company’s shares. The company is considered the institutional successor to the General Cotton Corporation, founded in 1970 following the nationalisation of cotton trading. In 1986, it was reconstituted as Sudan Cotton Company Ltd. (SCCL).
Installing a security figure at the helm of such a major economic institution signals an attempt to consolidate administrative and security control over strategic economic assets.
agricultural expert
The appointment triggered wide controversy among farmers and shareholders amid the company’s ongoing financial crisis and sharp decline in cotton production across the country’s major agricultural schemes. An agricultural expert—who requested anonymity—told Atar that installing a security figure at the helm of such a major economic institution “signals an attempt to consolidate administrative and security control over strategic economic assets.”
Why Was the Former Director Dismissed?
A well-placed source inside the company told Atar that the dismissed director had been appointed on a two-year contract, which had expired. The director allegedly attempted to conceal the signed contract between himself and the Board. After the outbreak of the war, he claimed that all company documents had been destroyed, looted, or burned. However—according to the source—fate did not work in his favour: a delegation from the Board arrived from Port Sudan to inspect the company premises in Khartoum and found the original contract intact among the surviving documents at the company’s headquarters. The source said this discovery was the key factor behind his removal.
Another company insider corroborated this account, but added that a copy of the contract had actually been found earlier, shortly after the Sudanese Armed Forces gained full control of Khartoum. According to this second source, what ultimately sealed the director’s fate was his refusal to approve a deal between the company and an external party.
The appointment of a new director generated its own media storm. According to Atar’s monitoring, a member of the company’s interim steering committee—and the representative of the Al-Jazirah Scheme on that committee—issued a statement denying that he had signed or approved the decision to appoint a new managing director. He described the signature attributed to him as forged, stating that he had not attended any committee meetings for more than a year and had not authorised anyone to act on his behalf. He stressed that the circulated claims about his approval of the appointment were “untrue.”
The company transformed into a centre of institutionalised corruption during the years of the former regime and beyond.
shareholder and farmer Kamal Sari
Speaking to Atar, Abdeen Bargawi—a leader in the Al-Jazirah and Al-Managil Farmers’ Alliance and a shareholder himself—commented that the appointment or removal of a company director “no longer concerns the farmers,” as the company has effectively come under the control of parties with no real connection to its farmer-owners. He added that the company’s activities have drifted far from farmers’ interests and needs, describing it as a “hub of entrenched corruption” since the era of the ousted president Omar al-Bashir. Bargawi called for an urgent general assembly so that farmers can be informed about the company’s affairs and have a say in its direction. He noted that despite the substantial shareholding held by farmers—particularly those of Al-Jazirah and Al-Managil—they have long been denied their natural right to elect the Board of Directors.
Similarly, shareholder and farmer Kamal Sari told Atar that the company’s founding mission was to improve farmers’ livelihoods and safeguard cotton production as a strategic pillar of Sudan’s economy. Instead, he said, the company transformed into “a centre of institutionalised corruption” during the years of the former regime and beyond.
A History of Corruption
For years, Sudan Cotton Company has ranked among the country’s most controversial institutions. Between 2014 and 2022, corruption allegations repeatedly surfaced in the media, and the courts held numerous sessions to prosecute influential figures within the company.
Throughout the trials under the former regime of President Omar al-Bashir, Joudah Suleiman al-Tahir—a farmer in the Halfa Al-Jadidah Scheme and a shareholder—regularly attended proceedings in Khartoum. He told Atar that every time a case seemed close to resolution, “new layers would emerge,” leading investigators to fresh allegations, describing the corruption as “self-replicating.” Al-Tahir considers the government’s interference in appointing the new director a continuation of past practices—an effort to maintain control over a company meant to belong to its farmers. Yet he also described the move as a “wake-up shock” that may finally prompt farmers to reclaim their rights.
In 2016, the Khartoum Central Court convicted former Managing Director Abdeen Mohamed Ali al-Fakki and board member Mohyeldin Osman on charges of creating shell companies funded with Sudan Cotton Company’s own assets. According to the court ruling—reported in several newspapers—the two established a network of companies financed by SCCL, the largest being Madcot International Trading, which held 350 shares. Other entities included Al-Mudaberat International, founded by Ain al-Qatar Engineering and Al-Faydi Excavations—firms linked by kinship to the first and second defendants.
Subsequent filings with the Registrar of Companies showed Madcot’s share distribution as follows: Sudan Cotton Company with 400 shares; defendant Mohyeldin Osman with 300; and defendant Mohamed Abdalla with 300.
In January 2007, Azar Engineering was incorporated under the names of defendant No. 7, Mohannad Ali Ahmed; Mohamed Bakri Hussein; and the late Mohamed Babiker Hussein. In 2010, documentation processed by defendant No. 5, Saad al-Din Mohamed Hamdan, showed Babiker transferring his shares to defendant No. 4, Dirgham al-Shaarani. Additional documents recorded another transfer by Babiker—who had died in 2008—also to al-Shaarani. After adjustments and restructuring, the shares stood as follows: Sudan Cotton Company with 500 shares; Madcot with 1,000 shares; Dirgham al-Shaarani with 1,750; and the second defendant with 1,450.
In 2009, another entity—Al-Dahna Contracting Ltd.—was formed with 100 shares split equally between defendants No. 3 and No. 7. The company was awarded contracts for civil works at the new ginneries. On July 21, 2010, Cam-No Engineering and Consulting Ltd. was established jointly by Madcot and Ahmed Haj al-Nur, and was assigned consultancy work for the new ginning facilities.
On May 2, 2007, Al-Ra’idah for Cotton Ginning was founded with the participation of Sudan Cotton Company, Madcot, Farmers’ Commercial Bank, the Social Security Consultancy Bureau, Shikan Insurance, and Turkish company Balkan. Later, on July 19, 2011, GC-Cot was established as a partnership between Sudan Cotton Company, Madcot, Abu Bakr al-Badri, defendant No. 7, and Ahmed Abdalla Omar.
The presiding judge noted that the first defendant served as chairman of the boards of all these companies—except one, KAN, chaired by defendant Moatasem Aba-Yazeed.
The court ultimately convicted the defendants, sentencing the first and second to 12 and 10 years in prison respectively, though the sentences were converted to exile due to both reaching the age of 70 in 2017 and 2020. The court further ordered the recovery of 16 billion Sudanese pounds for Sudan Cotton Company, as well as the return of tractors worth more than 16 billion pounds, and imposed a fine of one billion pounds on each defendant.
Private or Public? A Contest Over Ownership and Control
Why was al-Burhan’s brother authorised to act on behalf of a company owned by farmers?
Jad Karim al-Radi, former chair of the Board
According to Atar’s field reporting, the company’s current Board of Directors was originally formed from the provisional farmers’ unions appointed by the Committee for Dismantling the June 30 Regime after the fall of al-Bashir’s government. During that period, the company managed to fulfil a number of tasks—not least reviving its long-idle cotton gin in Halfa Al-Jadidah, which successfully operated for two consecutive seasons after years of inactivity.
Despite these gains, a representative of what he called the company’s “legitimate steering committee,” attorney Kamal Mohamed al-Amin, told Atar that the authorities had effectively reclassified the company from “private” to “public” in order to justify direct government intervention. He added that the Registrar of Companies had improperly approved the appointment of a company director by the Minister of Trade during the 2019–2021 transitional period. He criticised the government’s involvement in appointing managers and board members, arguing, “The company is, by its own registration, a private entity. Yet the state continued to intervene in ways that violate the Companies Act and the company’s Articles of Association.”
Al-Amin accused post–25 October 2021 authorities of paving the way for the return of the group previously convicted in 2016. He said the government routinely justified its interference by citing its indirect shareholding through Farmers’ Commercial Bank and the National Pension Fund.
The attorney further argued that the company’s reclassification as a public entity was carried out without any legal basis and without consulting its real stakeholders—the farmers. Under the Companies Act, he said, “there is no such thing as converting a private company into a public one.” Sudan Cotton Company has its founding law, he stressed, and no external authority has the right to place it under the supervision of another institution. He was referring to the transitional government’s decision to place SCCL under the Ministry of Trade. The minister at the time, Ali Geddo, went on to appoint a new managing director, who—after being dismissed following the October 25 coup 2021—then appointed the minister himself as a consultant to the company.
Al-Amin told Atar that his committee will soon file legal challenges against the government’s actions and the Registrar’s decisions. He insisted that the crimes committed within the company “will not go unpunished and will not be erased by the passage of time.”
In 2021, a fierce debate erupted over the company’s legal status after the government classified it as a public entity under the Ministry of Trade, financed through the Central Bank of Sudan using export proceeds from cotton and other commodities. Lawyers acting on behalf of farmers filed petitions challenging the decision. Al-Amin said they were waiting for an official advisory opinion from the Ministry of Justice in order to proceed with the case—an effort cut short by the October 25 coup and the subsequent outbreak of war.
Jad Karim Hamad al-Radi, the chair of the Board dismissed after the coup, criticised the Ministry of Trade’s move to appoint a director, calling it unlawful since the ministry “has no authority over a company owned by farmers.” He disclosed a document issued by the minister-appointed director authorising Hassan al-Burhan—brother of the coup leader Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Burhan—to act on behalf of the company in dealings with authorities in Al-Jazirah State, particularly concerning fixed and movable assets, land deeds, negotiations, and settlements. Al-Radi questioned the link between Hassan al-Burhan and one of the previously convicted figures in the cotton corruption case, Mohyeldin Osman.
Attorney al-Amin added that they have verified the existence of “shadow companies” formed from within Sudan Cotton Company itself—entities established by board leaders or managing directors—and that once security and political conditions stabilise, they intend to lodge formal complaints.
Where Do the Company’s Profits Go?
Sudan Cotton Company was built from farmers’ own profits—but their voices were reduced to theatre.
former board representative
Farmer and shareholder Kamal Sari told Atar that since the company’s establishment, shareholders have received profits only once—in 2009, when each shareholder received merely 12 pounds. Since then, farmers have neither received dividends nor been informed of the company’s financial performance. He recalled that only one general assembly meeting has been held, in 2009 at the Friendship Hall; no further meetings or consultations have occurred. Sari noted that farmers still hold their share certificates and bonds and vowed that they will present them when necessary to assert their rights. He argued that board appointments made without consulting shareholders violate the Companies Act and the company’s internal regulations. The appointment of multiple directors without convening a general assembly, he said, has created “the chaos and looting that now surround the company’s finances.”
A former leader in Al-Jazirah and Al-Managil Farmers’ Alliance—one of the project’s representatives on the company’s board—told Atar, on condition of anonymity, that Sudan Cotton Company was built through farmers’ unions in the irrigated schemes that grew cotton. Its founding capital came from deductions taken from farmers’ cotton profits between 1970 and 2005. During al-Bashir years, he said, decisions “arrived prepackaged,” and general assemblies—such as the one in 2009—“were mere theatre.”
On May 1 of this year, the company announced—via the state news agency SUNA—that it had begun preparations for planting 42,000 feddans of cotton for the new agricultural season: 20,000 in Blue Nile, 10,000 in al-Fao, 3,000 in Sinnar, 6,000 in Al-Jazirah, and 3,000 in Halfa Al-Hadidah.
The Managing Director also revealed arrangements for obtaining Saudi financing of USD 250 million to cultivate 500,000 feddans of cotton in Blue Nile, in addition to significant areas in Sinnar, Al-Jazirah, and Ar-Rahad.
A farmer from As-Shawal section of Al-Jazirah Scheme confirmed to Atar that the company had already planted 6,000 feddans in Al-Jazirah. Yet as the crop reached the fertilisation stage, the company failed to provide farmers with urea. He warned that the lack of fertiliser—at a time when the crop is approaching flowering—could cut yields by up to two-thirds, with severe repercussions. He added, “The company gave us seeds and prepared the land, but it is currently consumed by power struggles and pays no attention to our concerns, even though we are its partners.”
Farmer and shareholder Minnallah Khair al-Seid Adam of Ar-Rahad Scheme told Atar that they received no seed, fertiliser, or land preparation support from the company this year—despite public statements suggesting otherwise. He, too, received dividends only once, in 2009.
Adam expressed concern that funds reportedly secured through Saudi financing may be diverted to specific individuals within the company’s leadership. Regarding the appointment of a new director, he said the company’s substantial, unsupervised funds “make the position alluring,” adding, “The money is unmonitored and unaccounted for—misusing it is easier than drinking water.”
He questioned the relevance of the new director’s background to the company’s work, answering his own question, “Perhaps he—and those who appointed him—have their eyes on the company’s white gold.”
