Over more than two years of warfare, the conflict has carried people—and their markets—into displacement across the far reaches of Sudan. The country’s social and economic map has been continuously reshaped, shifting with each change in the military landscape, as control passes from one belligerent to another or recedes altogether.
This raises a central question: what has the war done to geography, society, and the economy?
At the same time, the intensification of commercial and military activity with neighbouring states has cast its shadow over Sudan’s border crossings, following changes in territorial control by the two sides to the conflict since the war began in April 2023. In turn, the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) decision in October 2024 to ban the transport of crops and goods from areas under their control to those held by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) led to an accumulation of commodities on both sides, a paralysis of buying and selling, and a historic collapse in prices in production zones across the Kordofan and Darfur regions.
Small-scale oil-processing factories in River Nile State and Port Sudan were also affected after the transport of sesame and groundnuts from western production areas was halted.
This raises a central question: what has the war done to geography, society, and the economy?
Alternative markets to Omdurman
Before the war, Omdurman market in the capital, Khartoum, stood as one of the country’s principal hubs for trade, imports, and exports across most regions of Sudan. Its inclusion within the theatre of military operations for a full year stripped it of that centrality, allowing new markets to grow and flourish across the country.
Not far from Omdurman market, Sabreen market in Karari locality emerged as the sole destination for residents of areas that fell alternately under the control of both warring parties in Khartoum State. Its commercial activity was marked by simplified procedures—particularly with regard to imported goods—as authorities replaced the former requirement for a commercial registration with a fine equivalent to one percent of the value of imported goods, alongside full payment of customs duties.
In the Northern State, the market of ad-Dabbah rose to become a post-war commercial operations center. The city absorbed traders and displaced populations alike and, by virtue of its geographic position along a bend in the Nile, reconnected western Sudan with the east. With the boom of ad-Dabbah market came the rediscovery of the historic Darb al-Arba‘in Road.
In the immediate aftermath of the war’s outbreak, car trading flourished in the city of Shandi in River Nile State, and its market began to expand rapidly. The city came to host three major markets distributed across its neighbourhoods: within the old central market (al-dilala al-qadima), east and west of Shandi Stadium, in addition to dozens of car showrooms and repair yards displaced from Khartoum and Wad Madani, spread along both sides of the railway line near the city market.
Following the army’s recapture of Khartoum State with allied formations, reverse displacement gathered momentum as people returned from the states. In northern Khartoum Bahri, markets revived in al-Saggai and al-Jaili, and al-Kadaru market resumed operations, accompanied by relative stability in the prices of commodities and foodstuffs. Al-Tahaddi Street, linking Khartoum Bahri and Atbara, now witnesses continuous truck traffic, while grocery stores, butcher shops, bakeries, and pharmacies along the road have reopened, alongside several outlets affiliated with flour companies such as Seiga, Rotana, and Weta.
Tamboul and Eastern Al-Jazirah
Immediately following the announcement on 20 October 2024 of Abu Aqla Keikel’s defection from the RSF and his alignment with the Sudanese army, RSF units launched attacks on several areas in eastern Al-Jazirah State. By late November 2024, these attacks had displaced an estimated 393,337 people to 46 locations across eight different states, with approximately 42 percent fleeing to areas within Al-Gadarif State.
Several markets in eastern Al-Jazirah were subjected to looting and destruction, most notably the market of Tamboul city—one of the largest markets in eastern Al-Jazirah and the al-Butana Plain. Tamboul hosts one of Sudan’s largest camel and livestock markets, supplied from across the al-Butana Plain stretching through the poor savanna belt, as well as cattle arriving from Kordofan, Sinnar, and Blue Nile states.
The market supplies the al-Butana region and eastern Al-Jazirah with a wide range of goods, foodstuffs, and livestock, and feeds much of the livestock traded in Halfa Al-Jadida and Ad-Damar markets. After the war, Tamboul acquired major economic significance for the RSF and their affiliates, serving as a conduit for goods into central Al-Jazirah State. It also connected the al-Butana Plain to eastern Sudan via Halfa Al-Jadida, from which goods were arriving.
Tamboul further became a transit point for looted goods taken out of Al-Jazirah State, particularly after the closure of the al-Khiyari–al-Shabarga road linking Al-Jazirah with Al-Gadarif during the rainy season. This led to competition—and conflict—among RSF affiliates within Al-Jazirah over control of the city.
Sinnar, the Blue Nile, and the White Nile
By late 2024, Tandalti’s market hosted 58 new oil presses, a displaced economy rebuilding itself on the move.
The RSF’s seizure of the strategic Jabal Moya area in June 2024, followed by their capture of the cities of Singa and Ad-Dinder, triggered the second-largest wave of displacement in central Sudan since the outbreak of war on 15 April 2023. This, in turn, reverberated through local markets, upon which residents had become entirely dependent after the destruction and looting of the capital’s markets, effectively isolating Blue Nile and White Nile states.
According to field-tracking teams of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 725,965 people were displaced due to fighting across Sinnar State—approximately 37 percent originally from Sinnar itself and 63 percent previously displaced there from other regions.
This displacement coincided with the evacuation of goods from markets. Traders in Sinnar’s main market moved their merchandise in anticipation of an RSF incursion, while those who transferred goods to Singa were subsequently looted. As a result, commodities became scarce and prices surged in the markets of White Nile and Blue Nile states.
In August 2024, RSF forces overran al-Tadamun locality in Blue Nile Region, forcing residents into displacement and shelter centers in Ad-Damazin. The deteriorating security situation prompted major farmers, companies, and their machinery to flee to South Sudan, fearing RSF reprisals.
Until early October 2024, when the Sudanese army managed to recapture Jabal Moya, residents of White Nile State relied on a rugged dirt road beginning in Ad-Diweem on the western bank, heading westward to Um Sayala in North Kordofan, then north to ad-Dabbah in Northern State—a journey spanning approximately 474 kilometers.
Between May and July 2023, the market of Tandalti in White Nile State, bordering North Kordofan, expanded significantly. By October 2024, the number of newly established oil presses in Tandalti market had reached 58, while footwear suppliers numbered at least 23. Sixteen clothing companies relocated parts of their operations there, alongside the migration of vulnerable commercial activities such as camel and sheep export trade.
Kordofan: Passage and siege
On 1 May of this year, the RSF announced their takeover of the city of An-Nuhud in West Kordofan—a city that had become a crucial commercial hub after the commodities exchange relocated there in the early months of the war, following the siege imposed on Al-Obeid, the capital of North Kordofan.
An-Nuhud had been hosting thousands of displaced people from across Darfur and Kordofan and lies along the main artery linking the capital, Khartoum, to the Darfur states. The RSF’s control of the city cast a long shadow over Al-Obeid, which faced new waves of displacement from surrounding areas seized by the RSF. Its markets suffered acute shortages of crops that had previously flowed in from An-Nuhud, Darfur, and other parts of Kordofan. Capital financing agricultural operations in An-Nuhud was looted, crops were stolen, and properties and transport trucks were plundered.
From Darfur to Libya—and back again
With every new battle, people rehearse displacement anew, learning unfamiliar routes, adapting to emergent markets.
In late 2024, displacement from the Darfur states led to the spread of Umm Duwarwar markets—local mobile markets—across villages, neighbourhoods, and towns in North Darfur.
Before the war, goods reached North Darfur through two main routes: one from Wadi Halfa on the Sudanese–Egyptian border to Omdurman, then via Bara to Al-Obeid and An-Nuhud, and onward along the Western Inqaz Road to Al-Fashir and the rest of Darfur; the other from Libya through Milliet, approximately 65 kilometers north of Al-Fashir.
With the wartime revival of ad-Dabbah market and the resurgence of the old route linking it to North Darfur, new commodities appeared in the Umm Duwarwar markets—particularly after the RSF seized control of the Milliet road and severed the connection between Milliet and Al-Fashir.
Thus, with every new battle, people are forced to rehearse displacement anew—learning unfamiliar routes, adapting to emergent markets, devising livelihoods they had never known, and encountering towns and cities they had never imagined would so profoundly shape their lives. The decision issued in late November by the governor of Northern State, banning the transport of goods and commodities to RSF-controlled areas in Kordofan and Darfur, marks yet another phase—one that may once again drive people toward new paths, new markets, and perhaps new kinds of goods altogether.
