Sudanese cities are gripped by a severe fuel crisis. Streets have turned into long, immobilized queues of vehicles clustered around petrol stations, while residents spend the better part of their day on an exhausting search for limited allocations of gasoline or diesel, often without any guarantee of success despite hours of waiting.
On March 31, Sudan’s Ministry of Energy and Petroleum announced that more than ten vessels had docked at Port Sudan, carrying diverse petroleum shipments, awaiting discharge, while over twenty additional tankers linger offshore in the Red Sea, awaiting their turn. The ministry further noted that the price of a barrel of diesel had tripled, from around $78 to $245, citing what it described as the “repercussions of geopolitical conditions.”
Brent crude prices experienced sharp volatility between early March and mid-April, rising significantly over the period and crossing the $100-per-barrel mark, a trend that has continued up to the time of this report.
Globally, the average price of gasoline stood at around $1.5 per litre as of April 13. In Sudan, assuming an average retail price of 6,250 SDG per litre, this equates to approximately $1.86 at the official exchange rate (3,350 SDG/USD), suggesting that global price increases explain only a fraction of the crisis.
When calculated at the parallel market rate (4,134 SDG/USD), the price drops to $1.51 per litre, pointing instead to deep-seated domestic distortions in distribution and management, as well as Sudan’s acute vulnerability to fluctuations in global markets.
A fragile system
April 2023 war damaged core infrastructure and reduced the state’s ability to respond to supply shocks.
Ahmed Al-Tayyib, petroleum engineer
A confluence of factors lies behind the current fuel crisis, predominantly domestic, though exacerbated by the war in the Middle East.
Speaking to Atar, petroleum engineer Ahmed Al-Tayyib, a specialist in macroeconomics and markets, attributes the crisis to overlapping internal and external shocks that have compounded its severity.
Domestically, the April 2023 war inflicted significant damage on the core of Sudan’s economy, triggering currency depreciation, eroding purchasing power, and raising operational costs across transportation and infrastructure sectors. Large segments of fuel production and distribution facilities were disrupted, notably the Al-Jaili refinery, as well as strategic storage depots in Al-Shajara, Garri, and Port Sudan, the latter having been targeted in May. These disruptions coincided with regulatory shifts in import mechanisms, reducing the flexibility of public policy in responding to supply shortages.
Historically, Sudan relied heavily on its oil infrastructure, including storage facilities housing strategic energy reserves, to manage supply flows. According to Atar’s monitoring, these facilities once operated at full capacity. However, following the April 15 war, authorities have increasingly depended on the steady flow of imports and the stability of global markets.
Data from the Central Bank of Sudan’s 2025 bulletin show that, in 2020, the country exported crude oil, gasoline, and kerosene valued at $44.9 million, $9.8 million, and $10.1 million respectively. In the years that followed through 2025, Sudan exported no petroleum products, while importing products worth approximately $808 million in 2025 alone, out of total imports estimated at $6.5 billion, representing 12.4 per cent of all imports.
Regional tensions in the Middle East have further driven up global fuel prices, alongside increased shipping and insurance costs, particularly for Sudan, which depends heavily on partners in Saudi Arabia and the UAE for its fuel supply.
While global price increases are significant, Al-Tayyib argued that Sudan’s economic fragility amplifies their impact. The war, he noted, is a central factor: adverse domestic conditions magnify the effects of any regional or international shocks.
Sudan petroleum imports (2012 – 2025)
Source: Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS)
Note: the figure does not show data from 2023, CBOS did not issue a report at the time.
The crisis extended beyond supply constraints to encompass the infrastructure of storage and distribution. Fuel depots in several regions have been damaged or attacked, reducing storage capacity and heightening risks associated with transportation. As these risks grow, importers have become more cautious about bringing in large volumes, fearing potential losses, and leading to reduced market supply and intensified scarcity.
These conditions have reshaped the market structure itself. Import operations are now concentrated in a limited number of companies following the exit of numerous players from the sector. This concentration has curtailed competition and granted remaining firms greater control over pricing. Meanwhile, transportation and distribution face significant challenges, including rising fuel costs, deteriorating infrastructure, and security risks, all of which add further pressure to the final consumer price.
Erratic policies
The sharp rise in fuel prices is tied to the shift from subsidies to price liberalization in 2021.
Al-Tayyib, macroeconomics analyst
According to Al-Tayyib, the rapid escalation in fuel prices is linked to the shift from a subsidy regime to price liberalization during the 2021 transitional period. A new pricing mechanism was adopted, based on global oil prices, shipping and insurance costs, exchange rate fluctuations, as well as federal and state taxes, and domestic operating and transport expenses.
Previously, fuel shipments would arrive at Al-Khair Port in Port Sudan and be stored in various depots before being distributed across states, explaining regional price disparities tied to transportation and operational costs.
“Any disruption in these variables, especially the exchange rate, feeds directly into the final consumer price,” Al-Tayyib noted.
In his view, the state currently lacks the tools necessary to absorb such shocks, resulting in abrupt and sharp price adjustments rather than gradual ones. The Middle East tensions have added yet another shock that Sudan’s economy struggles to withstand.
Prices are now increasing twice a month, driven by exchange rate fluctuations and limited access to foreign currency.
Fuel station owner, Sudan
A fuel station owner reports that prices have recently been rising at a striking pace—now increasing twice a month. He attributes this to fluctuations in the parallel exchange rate and the availability of foreign currency for private importing firms.
“These increases have effectively restricted import activity to a very small number of companies,” he said, noting that prior to the war, individuals could import fuel by obtaining the necessary approvals from the Ministry of Energy. Today, imports are largely confined to a handful of firms, most of them state-owned or affiliated with the ministry, which remain the primary suppliers.
On March 7, the Ministry of Energy announced the consolidation of 30 private companies into five joint groups under a fuel import program, while public sector firms aim to fill any remaining supply gaps. However, there has been no transparency or publicly available information regarding how these companies were selected.
Between official and parallel markets
Al-Tayyib explained the gap between official and parallel market prices as a function of supply shortages. Limited availability, whether at the national or regional level, or due to regulatory constraints, gives rise to parallel markets that aim to fill the gap while generating profit, resulting in higher prices than official rates.
In Sudan’s case, this shortage is linked to irregular supply flows, weak distribution systems, and official pricing that does not fully reflect real costs or the risks associated with import and transport operations, ensuring the persistence of parallel market activity.
While current prices reflect a large share of actual costs, including foreign currency procurement, shipping, insurance, inland transport, and taxes, distortions remain due to market concentration and elevated risk levels stemming from the war. Additional informal levies further inflate the final price, effectively constituting a “risk premium.”
Fuel prices in Sudan are also tightly linked to the exchange rate through what Al-Tayyib described as a feedback loop, a core mechanism in market systems. The depreciation of the Sudanese pound raises import costs, increasing demand for foreign currency and further weakening the local currency. While global oil prices remain important, exchange rate movements often have a faster and more direct impact, as importers immediately pass any change in the dollar’s value onto fuel costs.
According to the fuel station owner, fuel distribution operators face mounting structural challenges, including capital erosion that threatens business continuity. The costs of purchasing, transporting, and distributing fuel have surged, while profit margins remain fixed under government price controls, limiting the ability of station owners to cover rising expenses.
He further explained that prices had remained relatively stable for a prolonged period prior to the recent escalation tied to the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran, during which goods were available and exchange rates, including the customs dollar, remained steady. Since then, costs have risen sharply: the expense of transporting a 45,000-litre diesel tanker climbed from 153 million to 293 million SDG by mid-April. This has forced many stations out of operation or reduced their capacity by half due to liquidity shortages.
Frequent and sudden price hikes require station owners to secure ever-greater liquidity to maintain supply volumes, gradually depleting their capital and undermining their ability to keep pace. Although the government sets an official customs exchange rate, the parallel market remains the primary driver of pricing. Large-scale fuel imports push up demand for foreign currency in the parallel market, intensifying exchange rate volatility. As private companies rely on this market to secure hard currency, any depreciation is swiftly reflected in fuel prices.
Al-Tayyib concluded that Sudan’s fuel supply chain suffers from systemic weaknesses at every stage. Import processes are constrained by limited access to foreign currency and financing; transportation and distribution are hindered by deteriorating infrastructure, security risks, and rising costs; and geographic disparities impede balanced distribution.
As a strategic commodity, fuel has far-reaching implications. Any disruption in its supply or pricing directly affects agricultural, industrial, and service production, raises the cost of food transportation and distribution, fuels inflation, erodes household income, and ultimately places both economic and political stability at risk.
