As Sudan’s war enters its fourth year, the country’s humanitarian catastrophe is no longer merely a collection of figures circulated in international aid reports. It has evolved into an entire geography of displacement camps, migration corridors, and emergency shelters stretching from Darfur and Kordofan to the Northern, River Nile, Al-Gadarif, and Khartoum states.
Amid this increasingly fragmented landscape, humanitarian organizations now face a new crisis that could fundamentally reshape the aid sector itself, as access to millions of civilians becomes entangled in a growing battle over legitimacy between the warring parties.
Following the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) takeover of most of the Darfur region and large parts of Kordofan after the fall of Al-Fashir, the SAF’s last stronghold in Darfur, and later Babanusa in West Kordofan, the territorial reach of the Ta’sis alliance, led by the RSF, expanded considerably.
The offensives triggered new waves of displacement from both cities and their surrounding areas, while the Sudanese government, led by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), continued administering its territories from Port Sudan.
As this divide widened, fragmentation extended beyond the political and military spheres to the humanitarian sector itself.
On August 13, 2023, the RSF established, through a decree issued by its commander Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”), what it called the “Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), positioning it as a parallel body to the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC).
Two years later, on September 10, 2025, the prime minister of the Ta’sis government, formed through an alliance between the RSF, the SPLM-North faction led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu, and several political and civil actors, issued a decree creating the National Authority for Humanitarian Access (NAHA).
In what humanitarian workers described to Atar as a dangerous turning point, the NAHA circulated a directive on April 15 ordering all national and international organizations, as well as UN agencies operating in RSF-controlled territories, to re-register with the body in order to continue humanitarian work in those areas. The original deadline granted to organizations was no more than 72 hours before it was later extended to 45 days.
In response, the Sudanese government’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) issued a counter-directive warning organizations against engaging with the new entity, arguing that registration with the Ta’sis authorities could amount to support for, or recognition of, a parallel government.
Caught between the two directives, humanitarian organizations found themselves facing perhaps their most severe test since the outbreak of the war: how to continue reaching millions of civilians without being accused of siding with one camp or the other.
Amid a near-total silence from humanitarian organizations, particularly local groups, several sources working in the sector spoke to Atar on condition of anonymity about the mounting pressures they face under the competing directives imposed in areas controlled by both the SAF and the RSF.
After the deadline: Murky scenarios ahead
Many organizations now fear that any decision they make could jeopardize their ability to continue working in one jurisdiction or the other.
A humanitarian worker from West Darfur
A humanitarian worker in West Darfur, who requested anonymity, told Atar the recent directive issued by the NAHA would place severe obstacles in the way of aid delivery, while further complicating the movement and operational freedom of both international and local organizations in RSF-held areas.
He noted that field reports had not yet documented any actual suspension of organizations or direct disruption of humanitarian activities, largely because the registration deadline, set for 13 June, had not yet elapsed.
Although the NAHA stated in its extension notice that international and national organizations had shown “positive engagement” with the registration and accreditation procedures, the source said humanitarian organizations had thus far shown no clear signs of compliance, except for reports concerning newly established national entities affiliated with pro-RSF structures.
He added that the issue had been escalated to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) for consultation and coordination.
“The situation remains open to uncertain and murky possibilities,” he said, adding that it was difficult to predict what would happen once the deadline expired. The official warned that unregistered organizations were widely expected to face major difficulties in securing travel permits, implementing field operations, and accessing beneficiaries.
Another humanitarian worker from West Darfur, also speaking anonymously to Atar, said the crisis had generated deep anxiety across the humanitarian sector, particularly among organizations operating simultaneously in both SAF and RSF-controlled territories. Many organizations, he explained, now fear that any decision they make could jeopardize their ability to continue working in one jurisdiction or the other.
Some organizations, he added, have already begun reviewing their field presence and the daily movements of their staff out of concern over possible suspension or restrictions, while others have chosen to remain completely silent and avoid issuing any public statements regarding the unfolding developments.
Divisions within the humanitarian sector
According to a humanitarian source familiar with internal discussions among international organizations operating in Darfur, sharp divisions have emerged within the aid community over how to respond to the demands of the NAHA.
Some organizations, the source said, view the sharing of organizational information with the NAHA as a necessary step to preserve humanitarian access, while others fear such engagement could be interpreted as implicit recognition of a parallel administration or become an entry point for broader forms of oversight and control over humanitarian operations.
As organizations attempt to avoid confrontation with either side of the conflict, security pressures on humanitarian workers have already begun to intensify.
Despite repeated attempts by Atar to contact OCHA, the SAPA organization, and the humanitarian coordinator of the Darfur regional government, no responses had been received by the time this report was finalized.
According to information obtained by Atar, some organizations have already been expelled from RSF-controlled areas because they maintained offices or operations in territories administered by the SAF. The management of those organizations declined to comment publicly on the incidents for fear of political and security repercussions.
At the same time, sources say a humanitarian worker affiliated with the Sudanese Red Crescent Society had been detained inside RSF-controlled areas. Other testimonies described mounting restrictions and security harassment targeting employees of organizations still delivering humanitarian services, amid growing fears among aid workers of escalating security targeting.
Aid workers now find themselves between the hammer of the RSF and the anvil of the SAF.
A humanitarian worker in North Darfur told
In territories controlled by the SAF, the situation differs in some respects. Humanitarian assistance continues to flow more smoothly, while UN agencies have resumed operations from offices reopened in Khartoum. Nevertheless, sources from a humanitarian organization told Atar that the director of one organization had been arrested in Port Sudan on accusations that his organization had collaborated with the RSF.
Last April, Emergency Response Rooms (ERR) in Blue Nile State also suspended their activities after receiving verbal directives from HAC and regional security authorities.
The war and political fragmentation have also begun to affect state institutions themselves. Salaries for a number of civil servants residing in RSF-controlled areas have reportedly been suspended, deepening economic vulnerability in those regions and increasing dependence on humanitarian aid.
A humanitarian worker in North Darfur told Atar that aid workers now effectively find themselves “between the hammer of the RSF and the anvil of the SAF,” describing the situation as “a battle of wills” in which civilians are paying the highest price.
He argued that the registration requirements imposed in RSF-controlled territories triggered a predictable retaliatory response from the SAF, directly affecting the flow of humanitarian services. In his view, the current measures reflect “political competition” more than practical arrangements capable of full implementation on the ground.
The source stressed the need for civil society organizations to launch broad advocacy campaigns against what he described as the “politicization of humanitarian work,” emphasizing that the right of organizations to access civilians should not be construed as support for any armed actor.
He further revealed that many humanitarian workers are now seriously considering leaving the sector altogether should the new measures get to full implementation, fearing arrest or security persecution from any side. Such an exodus, he warned, could strip the humanitarian field of the national expertise currently responsible for managing the bulk of aid operations across Sudan.
Another source familiar with consultations between international organizations and UN agencies, speaking on condition of anonymity, said some humanitarian actors fear that any direct administrative engagement with the Ta’sis authorities could weaken the unified position that the United Nations and donors are attempting to maintain regarding humanitarian access arrangements in RSF-held territories.
Meanwhile, as fighting intensifies between the SAF and the RSF, and with much of North Darfur’s population displaced toward areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army faction led by Abdel Wahid Mohamed al-Nur, those relatively neutral territories have increasingly become a principal destination for humanitarian organizations and UN agencies seeking to continue operations away from direct polarization between the warring parties. The town of Tawila, in particular, has emerged as an alternative humanitarian hub within Darfur.
Political fragmentation has also spilled into local humanitarian institutions. A body bearing the name Red Crescent recently emerged in areas controlled by Ta’sis, parallel to the internationally recognized Sudanese Red Crescent Society affiliated with the Sudanese government.
According to information obtained by Atar, the newly formed body was later dissolved, while the parent organization avoided taking a direct public position, even as its volunteers continued operating across conflict zones.
These developments come at a time when Sudan is confronting one of the world’s most complex humanitarian emergencies. According to estimates by the Humanitarian Coordinator, the number of internally displaced people has surpassed 11 million, while more than 4 million Sudanese have fled to neighbouring countries. Refugee camps are now spread across eastern Chad, which hosts around seven camps, as well as Kenya, Uganda, and South Sudan.
Inside Sudan, meanwhile, the country’s map has effectively transformed into a sprawling network of displacement camps and temporary shelters.
In North Darfur alone, the town of Tawila, located in areas controlled by the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army led by Abdel Wahid al-Nur, hosts more than 800,000 displaced people distributed across 12 camps inside the town and five more outside it, according to information obtained by Atar.
Additional displacement camps have emerged in the Northern State; accommodating four camps, River Nile State (including Al-Nahda camp), and Al-Gadarif State, which hosts around eight camps.
Khartoum State, despite official restrictions on the establishment of displacement camps, continues to receive daily arrivals fleeing Darfur and Kordofan. Many are sheltering within residential neighbourhoods, particularly in peripheral areas such as Jabal Awlia, East Nile, Dar Al Salam, and the Martyr Abdel Wahab Centre in Al-Thawra’s Al-Iskan District 75.
Conversely, schools, government facilities, and public squares in RSF-controlled territories have been transformed into open shelters for displaced populations amid the near-total collapse of public services and repeated cycles of displacement. Some families, according to humanitarian accounts, have been displaced more than four times since the war began.
The impact on ERR
The continuation of these conditions could ultimately force many workers to withdraw entirely from humanitarian activity.
A volunteer with the North Darfur ERR
A volunteer with the North Darfur ERR, speaking anonymously to Atar, said directives issued by humanitarian bodies affiliated with the warring parties are now having a direct and decisive impact on the work of the ERR, inevitably affecting both the nature and delivery of grants.
He explained that the measures target international organizations and impose strict registration requirements as a precondition for funding local initiatives and organizations, including ERRs. These grassroots structures, he noted, are often not formally registered despite playing a crucial role in delivering humanitarian assistance after completing the necessary coordination and notification procedures with relevant authorities across Sudan’s fragmented landscape.
The volunteer explained that the ERRs remain unregistered primarily because they are community-based initiatives lacking the financial capacity to bear the high costs and fees associated with formal registration.
He warned that the new measures could have dangerous repercussions for volunteers operating through unregistered entities, exposing them to criminalization and legal or security persecution in different regions.
“The impact operates on several levels,” he said. “Internally, these pressures will reduce the mobility of volunteers and shrink the operational space available to them. Externally, they will inevitably restrict, or perhaps entirely cut off, access to grants because of mounting bureaucratic barriers.”
He added that the effects of the decision would likely extend to all organizations operating across territories controlled by both sides, particularly branch offices located in RSF-held areas, should they be compelled to register with the relief agency affiliated with the Ta’sis government. Such requirements, he argued, would create severe administrative and political complications that obstruct humanitarian work.
The volunteer stressed that the continuation of these conditions could ultimately force many workers to withdraw entirely from humanitarian activity, severely weakening the overall capacity for service delivery and dramatically widening the humanitarian gap — leaving only a handful of small, newly formed initiatives aligned with the Ta’sis authorities operating on the ground.
All of this is unfolding amid growing fears among some organizations that the information required under the new registration procedures, including staff data, operational scope, and geographical presence, could later be used as a tool for pressure or selective restrictions against humanitarian actors.
