The United States and Saudi Arabia, representing the “Jeddah Initiative Parties,” invited the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) to talks in Geneva, alongside international parties such as Egypt, the UAE, the African Union, and the United Nations. These talks, dedicated to opening channels for humanitarian aid and implementing the outcomes of the Jeddah Agreement of May 11, 2023, took place from August 14 and lasted ten days. Prior to the Geneva talks, separate discussions were held between the US and a delegation appointed by the Sudanese government, led by Minister of Minerals Mohammed Bashir Abu Namou. According to sources, Abu Namou’s delegation raised 11 questions during these discussions. The Sudanese government delegation later compiled a report summarising the US delegation’s responses to questions that had previously caused hesitation within the Port Sudan government regarding participation in the negotiations.
Leaks from the government delegation’s report, confirmed by several sources, indicate that six key issues were raised, reflecting the government’s concerns about US intentions. These included a refusal to include the UAE and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the mediation team, and questions about the decision to change the negotiation venue from Jeddah to Geneva. The delegation also linked any progress in new talks to the prior implementation of the Jeddah Agreement outcomes and rejected the idea of the Americans imposing a pre-determined agenda without consulting the government. The most critical question concerned the US administration’s view on the future of the RSF.
The US administration had hoped to open direct negotiation channels with SAF officers. However, the Port Sudan government sent a delegation led by the Minister of Minerals, which included members from SAF, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, intelligence, and SAF allies from various armed movements. Abu Namou publicly outlined the reasons for the delegation’s rejection during negotiations with the Americans in Jeddah, even before the Sovereignty Council’s statement. Mohammed Bashir Abu Namou is belonging to the Sudan Liberation Movement faction led by Minni Arko Minnawi, which emphasized their right to participate in negotiations, as they were deeply involved in the battles and had made significant sacrifices. This stance confused the mediators and cast doubts on the delegation’s authority to negotiate.
While the US addressed most of the questions posed by the government delegation, the delegation failed to provide answers related to the SAF’s plan to facilitate the passage of humanitarian aid or cease hostilities to allow relief efforts.
According to the government delegation’s report, there were several positive outcomes, including the US envoy’s responses to the government’s reservations about participating in talks involving the RSF. Notably, the US recognised al-Burhan as the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army
According to the government delegation’s report, there were several positive outcomes, including the US envoy’s responses to the government’s reservations about participating in talks involving the RSF. Notably, the US recognised al-Burhan as the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council and Commander-in-Chief of the Army, agreed to negotiate with the government delegation as the representative of the Sudanese government, and consented to change the negotiation date from August 14 to August 18, recognizing the significance of the first date for the SAF, marking its 70th anniversary. Lastly, the American envoy agreed to travel to Port Sudan to meet al-Burhan and clarify the US position, asserting that there is no political future for the RSF after their widespread violations and that the US does not equate the SAF and the RSF in terms of legitimacy or legality.
Despite these outcomes, the Port Sudan government delegation recommended maintaining the refusal to include the UAE and IGAD partners in the talks, insisting on the implementation of the Jeddah Agreement outcomes before proceeding to Geneva, and advocating for a return to the Jeddah talks pathway.
For months, international mediations, particularly by the US administration, have sought to understand the SAF’s leaders or at least open direct communication channels regarding the war’s outcomes in Sudan. However, little significant progress has been made. When direct communication with the SAF’s general commander became challenging, back channels were opened with his deputy, General Shams al-Din Kabashi, who met with the Deputy Commander of the RSF on January 20 in Manama, Bahrain. According to sources, al-Burhan was informed of these talks at the last minute, threatening their success and potentially widening the rift within the SAF and its allies.
Sources indicated that multiple messages, delivered through various means, have revealed General al-Burhan’s genuine motives behind his exploratory trips and tactics: to procure weapons capable of tipping the scales on the ground, either against the RSF or even within the SAF he leads.
General al-Burhan has long sought a deal with the United States, aiming primarily to acquire advanced Western weaponry. Since the ousting of President Omar al-Bashir, al-Burhan believed that US approval for SAF access to American weapons depended on implementing a civilian democratic transition in partnership with civil forces in August 2019. Later, with Donald Trump in the White House, al-Burhan discovered an alternative route through Israeli approval. In February 2020, he traveled to Entebbe, Uganda, to meet Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and agreed to proceed with the Abraham Accords and normalization with Israel, without consulting his civilian allies in the Forces of Freedom and Change. Al-Burhan openly stated his motive for pursuing normalisation with Israel, saying in an interview on Sudan National TV after his return from Entebbe that national interest was the priority and that the SAF had suffered greatly from the embargo preventing them from acquiring weapons. Moreover, al-Burhan has leveraged relations with Russia to pressure the West for arms on multiple occasions, as his predecessor Omar al-Bashir did.
Though al-Burhan has been clear about his objective in dealings with the West—lifting the embargo on the SAF to obtain Western weapons—he has faced numerous challenges in moving toward negotiations. Since leaving the General Command, he has adhered to his strategy and engaged in regional communications without explicitly revealing his requests or achievements.
Sources indicated that the facilitators of the Geneva talks were disappointed by the Sudanese government’s failure to send a delegation to Geneva. Instead, the Sudanese government announced that they had sent their delegation to Cairo for consultations with the Americans. This coincided with the US Secretary of State’s regional tour, which included Egypt, aimed at promoting a ceasefire agreement in Gaza. A source close to the US State Department expressed hope for a meeting with the government delegation during the Secretary’s presence in Cairo. However, according to information obtained, the American and Sudanese delegations could not meet due to insufficient coordination.
According to US envoy to Sudan, Tom Perriello, the meeting was canceled after the Sudanese delegation breached protocols. The Americans complained about the delegation’s composition and the absence of military representatives to ensure commitment to the agreements reached. The Sovereignty Council’s statement noted that two members of the government delegation arrived in Cairo on Monday, August 19, 2024, to meet the American delegation and were still awaiting the arrival of the rest of the delegation. They clarified that they had not come to Cairo for consultations on the Geneva events but rather to clarify their vision regarding the implementation of the Jeddah Agreement signed on May 11, 2023.
Several mediators know that the government delegation, while officially recognised as representing the government, lacks a sufficient mandate to proceed with implementing a cessation of hostilities or even negotiate a safe exit plan for RSF personnel from civilian homes and facilities such as hospitals and schools.
What is al-Burhan’s Plan?
In August last year, General al-Burhan left the SAF’s General Command headquarters for the new government headquarters in Port Sudan, in the far east of Sudan, after four months of war, during which he was besieged inside the General Command. His departure represented a golden opportunity for him to explain the circumstances of the war, his objectives, and his plan to protect the Sudanese people and achieve victory. However, it seems that his plan did not prioritize the safety and well-being of the people.
Al-Burhan’s first public speech after the outbreak of war was in April 2023, where he expressed confidence in overcoming the crisis “through experience, wisdom, and strength” to achieve a safe transition to civilian rule. However, his tone changed in a subsequent speech, where he announced a general mobilisation on June 27, 2023. A year has passed since his departure from the General Command headquarters, and the Sudanese people continue to face uncertainty regarding his plans and policies, which affect their daily lives and the cycles of displacement and refuge they endure.
Al-Burhan is reticent about his plans, making it difficult to predict his actions and decisions. It is also challenging to anticipate the inner circle of advisors he relies on for such sensitive issues. Recently, General al-Burhan, as the Commander-in-Chief of the army, decided not to go to Geneva or send a delegation to participate. Instead, he issued a decision to open the Adré crossing on the Sudanese-Chadian border. The international community welcomed this decision, which allows the United Nations to send humanitarian aid to Sudan, and thanked the Sudanese government for it.
The United Nations had several shipments of food waiting for official permits to cross the border from Chad into Sudan. Now, UN agencies have announced that trucks loaded with 120 metric tons of food and health aid have crossed, while other shipments are still awaiting passage permits. The Sovereignty Council followed this decision with another statement, announcing that al-Burhan had directed the supervision of border crossings to be transferred to the Sovereignty Council. A UN source indicated that although the RSF has cooperated in delivering aid, their checkpoints sometimes do not allow the trucks to pass for undisclosed reasons.
According to a joint statement issued by the mediating parties in the Geneva talks, no representatives from the Sudanese government or the SAF participated. However, a delegation from the RSF was present and expressed its willingness to protect relief convoys and secure aid workers in the designated areas. The mediators issued a joint statement on Monday, August 21, in which they expressed their dismay that the SAF refused to attend the talks, stating that humanitarian access must be provided and that failure to do so is unacceptable. The statement also clarified that any future invitation for talks would depend on the assessment of the parties’ seriousness about their humanitarian responsibilities.
“Atar” has learned that many parties have been pressuring General al-Burhan and the SAF to open the crossings and facilitate relief operations. Although the SAF does not have control over most of the crossings in Darfur, it is essential for the United Nations to obtain permission from Sudanese authorities before proceeding to send aid to more than 20 million people in desperate need of food.
Al-Burhan’s tactics have put the RSF to the test, facing the challenge of cooperating with their allied militias and mercenaries in Darfur to deliver aid to civilians and displaced people. However, this also risks giving the RSF an opportunity to gain international recognition in the areas they control if they succeed in passing this test and safely delivering the aid.
In the end, the situation remains complex, and the Sudanese people continue to endure the devastating consequences of a protracted conflict with no clear resolution in sight.
Understanding General al-Burhan
Sources indicated that multiple messages, delivered through various means, have revealed General al-Burhan’s genuine motives behind his exploratory trips and tactics: to procure weapons capable of tipping the scales on the ground, either against the RSF or even within the SAF he leads.
The past five years of Sudanese history have provided significant insight into the character and decisions of General al-Burhan, the commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). Since the ousting of former President Omar al-Bashir on April 11, 2019, a revolution supported by the SAF, al-Burhan has been a central figure in Sudan’s tumultuous political landscape. Many viewed the army’s involvement in al-Bashir’s removal as a move to protect its own institutional interests.
At the time of the revolution, al-Burhan had just been promoted to the rank of General and appointed as the SAF’s Inspector General. His military career was extensive, including a significant role in the Land Forces Operations Authority, where he eventually became the Deputy Chief of Staff. During his tenure in the Land Forces, al-Burhan coordinated troop deployments to Yemen as part of Operation Decisive Storm. His collaboration with Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as “Hemedti,” the leader of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), was crucial until the overthrow of al-Bashir and al-Burhan’s rise to the presidency of the military council.
Al-Burhan’s statements and actions have consistently emphasized a deep appreciation for the concept of the homeland, though this has often been interpreted as prioritizing the state over individual citizens. His ascent to the presidency of the military council was facilitated by a bilateral agreement with Hemedti, who became his deputy and played a protective role in expanding his influence, and allowed him to secure key roles in the transitional period, including leading the government delegation in the Juba peace talks in 2020 and chairing the Supreme Economic Committee.
Despite assurances of a stable relationship between the SAF and the RSF, tensions have been evident. Al-Burhan’s leadership faced its first major challenge with the violent dispersal of a peaceful sit-in in front of the SAF’s general command headquarters. The operation, conducted without warning and resulting in the deaths of over 200 peaceful protesters, was followed by a speech in which al-Burhan attributed the loss of lives to a deviation in his plan. He froze negotiations with civilian forces and proposed a caretaker government, although these plans were soon abandoned in favor of renewed negotiations.
Al-Burhan’s leadership has been marked by a series of decisions that are often retracted or revised shortly after being made, creating a sense of unpredictability and confusion among the Sudanese people. His involvement in the 2021 military coup against the transitional government further complicated Sudan’s political landscape. Although he initially dissolved the government and promised to form a new transitional administration, he later reinstated the prime minister, only for the latter to resign soon after. Al-Burhan’s indecision has continued to affect Sudan, with his latest return to negotiations with the Forces of Freedom and Change coming just before the outbreak of war on April 15, 2023.
The Sudanese people have come to understand that al-Burhan’s leadership is characterized by a cycle of critical decisions followed by sudden reversals, leaving them uncertain about the future and the direction of their country.
About the Adré crossing
Following the start of ceasefire negotiations in Geneva, from which the SAF was notably absent, the Sudanese Sovereign Council announced the opening of the Adré crossing on the Chad-Sudan border. This move, intended to facilitate humanitarian aid delivery, was welcomed by mediators and international powers, though it raised questions about the SAF’s intentions and control over the crossing.
The Adré crossing, a vital link between Chad and the Darfur region, has been central to both commercial trade and humanitarian operations. However, its strategic importance has also made it a point of contention in the ongoing conflict. The SAF had previously closed the crossing, citing its use by the RSF for smuggling weapons. The reopening of the crossing under government supervision appears to be part of a broader strategy by the SAF to assert control and influence in the region.
The situation at the Adré crossing highlights the complex dynamics at play in the Sudanese conflict, where military, political, and humanitarian interests intersect. The SAF’s decision to reopen the crossing and subsequent diplomatic engagements suggest a nuanced approach to managing the conflict, balancing military operations with efforts to maintain international support.
In summary, the reopening of the Adré crossing reflects the ongoing covert negotiations and strategic maneuvers between the SAF and international mediators, as Sudan’s conflict continues to evolve.
