



Sudan in Perspective

Issue 5, Monday, May 20, 2024

Famine Looms in North Kordofan amidst conflict

Sheikh Musa Hilal backs SAF in power tussle: maneuver or competition?

 *Climate Justice and the Reconstruction of Sudan*

 *Sudan's Chronicle*

 *Dirbis: A Canine's tale in war-torn Nyala*

Marhaba!

This is the fifth issue of “Atar” English magazine, from Sudan Facts Center for Journalism. It will be coming to you on Monday, after every two weeks.

Sudan ranks 179th globally in terms of the impact of climate change out of 185 countries, making it sixth in terms of eligibility for climate compensation, which was approved at the COP27 conference held in Sharm El-Sheikh at the end of 2022. Sudan will continue to face more economic and social challenges due to climate change unless international climate policies change. Sari Al-Haj writes about climate justice and Sudan’s reconstruction after the ongoing war.

Instead of contributing to the country’s agricultural exports, farmers in North Kordofan State face the specter of hunger roaming across Sudan. War and its resulting violations made last year’s agricultural season impossible, as well as these days when they were expected to start preparing for it, like every year. Instead of plowing the land, sowing seeds, and wait-

ing for rain, they stand astonished at the ravages of war in their cities, towns, and once peaceful villages. Mohammed Abdel-Bagi brings us the tragic picture from the cities of Um Rawaba, Al-Rahad, and Wad Ashana. “Words won’t bring joy if the situation isn’t joyful!”

In 2017, Omar Al-Bashir enlisted Mohammed Hamdan Daglo “Hemeti” to end the rebellion of Sheikh Musa Hilal and initiated what he called the ‘weapons collection campaign.’ Now, history repeats itself with the usual irony, as the SAF enlists Sheikh Hilal to eliminate the rebellion of “Hemeti”. If history repeats itself, it’s because the conflict factors in the region have remained constant for decades, while conditions fluctuate between calm and stormy. This is what the events and paradoxes say after the return of Sheikh Musa Hilal to the forefront of events. A report prepared by the Atar Network.

In the “Sudan Chronicle” section, a section compiled by Atar correspon-

dents, we read about the developments in Al-Fashir in the past week, stained with blood due to the escalating battles between the RSF and the Joint Force of Darfur movements, which declared their allegiance to the SAF. In Al-Damazin, a state of emergency prevails, declared since before the war, exacerbated by curfews and travel restrictions, even to neighbouring states. In Omdurman, residents struggle to navigate in a map shared by the SAF and the RSF. This section is written by Atar correspondents in Sudanese cities.

Most residents of neighbourhoods in Nyala city, beside the human insecurity, face the animal danger in every street. Stray dogs do not fear even the sounds of guns, nor do they show mercy. Adam Ibrahim writes about what happened to Dirbis, the beloved pet dog, and how his habits and behavior changed after returning home to find his owner had passed away. 🍕

Atar team

In this issue:

- ◇ **Famine Looms in North Kordofan amidst conflict 5 - 9**
Muhammad Abd Albagi
- ◇ **Sheikh Musa Hilal backs SAF in power tussle: maneuver or competition? 10 - 13**
Atar Network
- ◇ **Climate Justice and the Reconstruction of Sudan 14 - 18**
Sari Nougud
- ◇ **Sudan's Chronicle 19 - 24**
- ◇ **Dirbis: A Canine's tale in war-torn Nyala 25 - 26**
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 **Atar**
Sudan in Perspective
From

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In North Kordofan, farmers had cleared their lands in anticipation of the long rains, expected from around May 18. However, conflict erupted in Khartoum in April 2023, leading to the withdrawal of executive authorities and police from the region, and their redeployment to El-Obeid, the state capital and headquarters of the Fifth Infantry Division, known as Hajana, aka camel jockeys.

Despite the war's focus on major cities, the rural residents of North Kordofan, living in areas devoid of military garrisons, felt a false sense of security. Ahmed Eissa, a pseudonym, all interviewees in this report use the false names due to fears of retribution, expressed disbelief that the conflict would reach their peaceful, ethnically diverse communities.

Life continued as usual, with preparations for Eid Al Fitr and the planting season underway, despite the absence of government presence. But tranquility was shattered on May 10 when Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacked Al Rahad Abu Dakana, looting markets, vehicles, banks, and government buildings, and killing 23 civilians on the first day.

Eissa said: "It never crossed our minds that rural areas would become a stage for military operations or the spread of armed robbery. In addition to the peace and strong ties between its various ethnic and racial components, the rural regions of North Kordofan have started to enjoy it; it is evident that the military headquarters of both fighting parties exist.



Wad Ashana administrative unit, Umrawaba locality, North Kordofan state. Source: [GADM](#)

"Paying no attention to the ongoing war, life continued its mundane rhythm. Despite the disappearance of executive authorities, people carried on with their preparations for Eid Al Fitr, also known as Lesser Bairam, which followed the war and planting season, and the market kept operating as usual."

Later, RSF set up checkpoints along the national road and other strategic locations.

The violence spread to nearby villages, including Eissa's, located 25 kilometres from Al Rahad. The RSF's pillaging and violence forced residents to flee to El-Obeid and Um Rawaba, cities not yet invaded by the RSF. The farmers, feeling threatened, ceased their agricultural activities, fearing for their lives and livelihoods.

Some farmers were forced to sell their seeds, while others took refuge in safe areas in the hope that stability would return

to start farming again. Citizens paid the price for it: a severe shortage of sorghum, which is the main food for the entire state's population, which has put them on the brink of hunger at the present time.

North Kordofan's Plight

North Kordofan, with its capital El-Obeid, features a climate ranging from mild savannah to semi-desert. Its economy is driven by diverse agriculture and pastoralism, bolstered by its position on the railway connecting Kosti and El-Obeid. Um Rawaba, a significant trade centre for oil-seeds and Hibiscus, and Al Rahad, a historical resistance site during the Mahdist Revolution, are key economic and agricultural hubs in the state.

Abdelrahim, another interviewee, described the dire living conditions in Al Rahad and surrounding villages, where food supplies are scarce, and armed robberies are rampant by men in RSF uniforms. Many rely on remittances from family abroad, as the conflict has decimated local farming, pushing the community to the brink of famine after they lost their savings as a result of a year of buying commodities with skyrocketing tripled prices.

The disruption of trade routes has led to shortages

of essential supplies (seeds, fertilisers, insecticides and fuel) and soaring market prices. A sack of sorghum, for example, has tripled in price within a year (from 24 thousand Sudanese pounds in April of last year to 75 thousand currently). The widespread insecurity has forced merchants to abandon the region, exacerbating the food crisis.

Abdelrahim explained: "Only a few people are able to obtain food supplies via money transfers from family members abroad. As for the farmers who constantly relied on Kordofan land production, what they have now is almost nothing after the war hindered their ability to farm.

"Now they are on the brink of famine, having lost their money and savings as a result of a year of buying commodities

at skyrocketing, tripled prices. The prolonged cut of trade roads has led to a dwindling of supplies such as seeds, fertilizers, insecticides, and fuel, while the market prices have continued to skyrocket."

The food crisis is no longer a matter of food affordability, but unavailability of food supplies.

After the RSF's destructive sweep through Al Rahad, the prospect of agriculture became untenable. Al Tahir, who relocated his family after the war

The food crisis is no longer a matter of food affordability, but unavailability of food supplies. After the RSF's destructive sweep through Al Rahad, the prospect of agriculture became untenable.

from Khartoum to Um Aushra village in the rural part of Wad Ashana, hoped to cultivate his inherited land that had been left fallow for ten years, but he found farming impossible amid the chaos and violence.

The delayed RSF invasion of Um Rawaba in August did not spare the residents from suffering. Thieves, operating under the gaze of the RSF, plundered grain stores for ten days, selling stolen goods at a fraction of their value (sack of sorghum for 10 thousand SDG instead of 40 thousand, and cooking oil for 6 thousand instead of 32 thousand, and 50 kilos sugar sack for 10 thousand instead of 50 thousand).

Ibrahim Abd Algadir, another resident using a pseudonym, recounted how the RSF and gangs looted everything, including hospitals, leaving the population in fear, hunger, and mourning.

“Main markets in the state were disrupted, including the Um Aush market, located south of Khor Abu Habel, which is the main supplier of agricultural and animal products. Additionally, the market in the city of Shirbila, located south of Um Rawaba, was affected, forcing the residents of North Kordofan State to shop in Tandalti, in the White Nile State,” said Ibrahim to an Atar reporter.

The UN has [reported](#) that 24 million people in Sudan urgently need humanitarian aid, with 18 million facing acute hunger. The FAO has highlighted the severe limitations on food access and the

The delayed RSF invasion of Umrawaba in August did not spare the residents from suffering. Thieves, operating under the gaze of the RSF, plundered grain stores for ten days.

destruction of markets and food stocks. Sudan’s cereal production has dropped by 40 per cent, signaling a deepening hunger crisis.

UNICEF’s executive director, Catherine Russell, noted that 3.7 million children in Sudan require urgent nutritional support, with many living in hard-to-reach areas.

Ahmed Abd El Azim, from Wad Ashana administrative unit, at the eastern part of Um Rawaba locality, which has been swept by RSF last October, killing 12 civilians, detailed how more than 432 villages are trapped in the crossfire between the RSF and government authorities, cut off from food and medical supplies. The markets and medical centers are closed, leaving children severely hungry and mothers without healthcare.

Ahmed pointed out that the residents of the Wad Ashana administrative unit, which starts from the village of Al-Bawabnis, 13 kilometers south of the Kosti-El-Obeid national road, to the village of Kuru, about 450 kilometres in the far north of Kordofan, are facing extreme difficulty in their movement due to the deployment of armed gangs that cooperate with the RSF, while the security authorities in White Nile State prevented the transfer of food supplies to areas controlled by the RSF.

Ibrahim Yasine, from Alrebita village, described a region abandoned by civil society organisations, resistance committees, and governmental authorities, leaving only gangs and armed robbers to roam freely.

He said: “No communications networks, and people cannot protect Starlink devices from looting, so they should

The situation in North Kordofan is a stark reminder of the human cost of conflict and the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to prevent a full-blown famine.

go to Tandalti to conduct their communications and mobile banking transactions through very dangerous roads.”

The situation in North Kordofan is a stark reminder of the human cost of conflict and the urgent need for humanitarian assistance to prevent a full-blown famine.

First published in Arabic, *Atar* weekly magazine, 30th issue, May 16, 2024.

In a significant turn of events, Sheikh Musa Hilal, a figure often mired in controversy, has declared his support for the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) in their conflict with the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This announcement came during a gathering in Mustariha, North Darfur, where tensions have been high since April 2023.

Musa Hilal, who leads the Revolutionary Awakening Council (RAC), is a member of the Al-Mahameed clan of the Rizeigat Arab tribe, a group with a strong presence in western Sudan. His counterpart in the RSF, General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as “Hemeti,” belongs to the Mahariya clan of the same tribe.

Hilal’s rise to prominence dates back to the 2003 Darfur war, where he led the Border Guard Forces, composed mainly of Arab tribesmen, in support of the SAF and then-President Omar al-Bashir’s regime. They scored significant victories against the Darfuri armed movements, driving them from key areas in the region.

Despite his popularity and pastoral roots, Hilal’s shifting allegiances and frequent disputes with other leaders have kept him in the public eye. His actions during the Darfur conflict led to severe allegations, culminating in a 2006 United Nations sanction that included travel bans and asset freezes.

After being appointed as an advisor to the Ministry of Federal Governance in

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2008, Hilal grew dissatisfied, viewing the role as symbolic and lacking influence. He criticized the government for neglecting the Arab militias that had been instrumental in the war effort, leading to his return to Mustariha and subsequent vocal opposition to al-Bashir’s administration.

For its part, al-Bashir government, seeking international approval and distancing itself from the militia’s atrocities in the Darfur war, disbanded the Border Guard Forces but tried to placate Hilal with an advisory role.

The government’s response to Hilal’s growing clout was to establish the RSF in 2013, with Hemeti at the helm, exploiting existing intra-Rizeigat clan rivalries. Post-Bashir’s 2015 election victory, the government’s actions in Darfur, including integrating the Border Guard Forces into the RSF, were seen as moves to limit Hilal’s power.

Musa Hilal

Hemeti

Established the Border Guard Forces

2007

Fought in the Darfur war with the Border Guard Forces

Seized control of Jebel Amer, amassing significant wealth from gold

2013

Founded the RSF, attached to the National Intelligence and Security Service

Rejected the government's reconciliation plan, launched his own campaign

2014

Returned to Darfur after fighting with the intelligence service in South Kordofan

Advanced his political ambitions via the RAC

2016

Became RSF commander under a new government law

Opposed the disarmament campaign, arrested in Khartoum

2017

Led the civilian disarmament campaign

Hilal's disillusionment with the SAF, after years of collaboration, was exacerbated by a disarmament campaign targeting vehicles and motorcycles, which he staunchly opposed. His capture by the RSF in 2017 and subsequent imprisonment until the 2019 uprising marked a low point in his relationship with the government.

A presidential decree later reversed the integration of the Border Guard Forces into the RSF, reinstating them under the SAF. This shift occurred a week after the outbreak of war in April 2023.

The transitional period saw Rizeigat leaders pressuring for Hilal's release, which was eventually secured through an agreement with Hemeti's brother, General Abdel Rahim Dagalo. However, the

terms of this agreement led to rifts within the RAC and some members defecting to the RSF.

In early February of this year, an Arab tribal leaders' delegation from the five Darfur states met Hilal. The meeting attended by high-ranking RSF officers, including Major General Giddo Abenshok, RSF commander for North Darfur, and Major General Ali Yaqoub, RSF commander for Central Darfur, who sanctioned by USA administration on mid-last week.

Sources told Atar Network that the meeting which prompted by RSF leadership, agreed to return seized Hilal's assets and for him not to opposing the RSF.

However, an alleged assassination attempt on Hilal in April has raised ten-

sions. Hilal's call for accountability from Awlad Rashid tribe, to which the suspect belongs, resulted in a public declaration of support for the SAF against militias.

This stance has caused a rift within Arab tribes, particularly the Al-Mahameed, whose leaders have publicly distanced themselves from Hilal, emphasizing their allegiance to the RSF and criticizing the SAF's actions.

The evolving alliance between the RAC and the SAF, including a military supply drop by the Sudanese Air Force, indicates a rapid shift in dynamics. The historical pattern of alliances and conflicts in the region continues, with the balance of power remaining as fluid as ever.

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At the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) Climate Change Conference, held late last year in Dubai, representatives from participating nations agreed to initiate a Loss and Damage Fund to compensate poor countries for the adverse effects of climate change.

This agreement, a revival of the initiative proposed at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference, was originally established during COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt at the end of 2022. The estimated compensation at the time was approximately \$100 billion annually, intended to offset the economic and social damages caused by climate changes in poorer countries.

Observers view the implementation of this decision as a historic victory toward achieving long-awaited climate justice.

Questions, however, arise:

Does Sudan qualify for these climate compensations? Can this project realistically serve as a lifeline for the Sudanese economy, aligned with its environmental context and investment opportunities, to help revive its production cycle?

It is widely acknowledged that industrial activity is the primary contributor to global warming, heavily reliant on the extraction of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas) as energy sources. These resources facilitated the industrial revolution, economic prosperity, and social security of Northern nations (Europe and America).

For over a century and a half, these Northern countries have expanded in-



COP27 – Sharm El-Sheikh – Reuters



COP28 - Dubai - AP

dustrially, exploiting and polluting the earth's environment, thereby assuming historical responsibility for the planet's natural disasters and sustainability challenges, particularly those arising from global warming and its destructive effects. Thus, the concept of climate justice emerged as a social, political, ethical, and perhaps religious framework to address fairness among humans concerning climate change, identifying the culprits and the victims.

You might wonder why poorer countries, particularly Sudan, are more severely impacted by climate change. To answer this question, please refer to the world map provided in Figure 1.

A geographical analysis of wealthy, industrially active countries reveals that most of them are located north of the tropics, in cooler and very cold regions.




Figure 1 (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative) shows the extent to which countries worldwide are affected by climate change. [Source](#).

Consequently, the impact of rising temperatures in these areas is relatively limited, given their naturally cold climates and their economic capacity and advanced technologies that enable them to adopt appropriate measures to adapt to the slight temperature increases.

Conversely, and paradoxically, most poor countries, including Sudan, lie in tropical regions close to the equator, known for extremely high temperatures that can reach up to 55 degrees Celsius in summer.

According to a recent statistics report by the University of Notre Dame, Sudan ranks 179th globally in terms of vulnerability to climate change out of 185 coun-

tries, making it the sixth most deserving of compensation. This is evident from the extreme climatic phenomena observed in recent years.

In 2022, floods devastated approximately 5.4 million acres of agricultural land in Sudan, affecting nearly 600,000 families who lost their crops and grazing lands. Over 108,000 livestock perished, 31 villages and 47,000 homes were destroyed, 89 people died, and 136,000 were displaced, according to a [United Nations report](#).

In terms of desertification and drought rates, these phenomena have accelerated significantly, accompanied by a noticeable reduction in vegetation cover.



Flood-hit areas, 2022 – Independent



Drought north of Al-Fashir /AFP/Getty Images

This has led to the death and destruction of many living organisms and livestock, resulting in waves of famine and the outbreak of armed conflicts over grazing land.

The ongoing war in Sudan, which has lasted for over a year, is one manifestation of climate change, exacerbating the conflict over resources.

Additionally, Sudan has become a refuge for many climate refugees from sub-Saharan countries, where life has become untenable due to desertification and drought waves sweeping across Niger, Mali, and Chad.

Consequently, Sudan has emerged as a sanctuary and a climate destination,

boasting water resources and agricultural lands compared to the sub-Saharan countries.

Estimates indicate that the migration waves from West Africa to Sudan will double in the coming years due to the escalating heat in those areas, exposing Sudan to further economic, security, and demographic challenges.

A [study](#) by the Christian Aid confirmed that under current climate policies, Sudan might face a 32.4 per cent decline in GDP by 2050 and an 83.9 per cent decline by 2100 as a direct result of climate change. This implies that Sudan has been and will remain exposed to more economic and social challenges due to climate change, unless international climate policies change.

Given that Sudan lacks the economic capabilities to combat the effects of climate change, and considering that Sudan has never been responsible for raising the planet's temperature—with a Sudanese citizen's carbon footprint estimated at only 0.45 tons compared to 16.1 tons for an American enjoying a high standard of living—Sudan is considered one of the top nations deserving of financial compensation, particularly for its exposure to the economic, security, and political impacts of climate change.

Following Sultan Al Jaber's (President of COP28) [announcement](#) on the enforcement of the Loss and Damage Fund, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) pledged a contribution of \$100 million,

followed by the European Union and Japan with approximately \$600 million, bringing the total initial pledge to around \$790 million. Observers deem this amount insufficient to compensate developing countries for their estimated \$400 billion in losses.

Frederick Roeder from the Global Citizen, an NGO, [said](#) the billion-dollar profits of oil and gas companies could meet all the fund's requirements. The US representative hinted that the countries not historically responsible for global warming, such as China and Gulf countries, whose industrial revolutions began relatively late, should also contribute to the fund.

The current debate that the fund should finance renewable projects benefits Sudan.

The proposed Green Climate Fund will focus solely on financing renewable energy projects, aligning with Sudan's need to expand and increase opportunities for dams and solar energy projects, directly addressing the energy gap and enabling the management of agricultural industrial projects.

Against this legitimate backdrop, and amid the raging war in Sudan, a promise emerges to overcome the financial hurdles of rebuilding Sudan once the war ends, through the Loss and Damage Fund.

This marks the first time environmental and climate advocates have proposed a political decision-making project that brings direct benefits without sacrifices.

Amid the raging war in Sudan, a promise emerges to overcome the financial hurdles of rebuilding Sudan once the war ends, through the Loss and Damage Fund.

It will be beneficial for Sudan to activate its partnership with IGAD countries, many of which are among the most affected by climate change and most deserving of compensation, to continuously pursue and pressure international parties responsible for implementing this project, thereby thwarting opposition from politically influential capitalist groups that fear losing their grip on the global economy.

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Sudan's Chronicle:

- *Al-Damazin under siege*
- *Al-Fashir. A city wounded by conflict*
- *Omdurman: The divided city*

 **Diaries recorded by Atar correspondents**





Al-Damazin under siege

Atar correspondent

In the wake of the RSF's advance on Wad Madani, the capital of Al-Jazirah state, and the subsequent army withdrawal, the southern part of Sudan has been transformed from a safe haven into a landscape of fear and uncertainty. Al-Damazin, once a city of tranquility, now finds its residents engulfed in a cloud of dread as the specter of war looms ever closer.

The intensification of RSF attacks in the western and southern regions of Al-Jazirah state has led to a significant displacement of the population, many of whom have sought refuge in Al-Damazin, the capital of Blue Nile state. This influx has exacerbated the already critical situation of displaced persons in the state, following the outbreak of war in Khartoum. Displaced families have been

distributed among schools and public spaces, receiving aid from local residents as real estate prices soar in response to the crisis.


Since tribal incidents in 2021, Blue Nile state has been subjected to a state of emergency, renewed monthly by the government. With the current conflict escalating last April, attempts by activist youths to establish Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs) were thwarted by the government, citing a ban on gatherings. A curfew has been imposed, restricting movement from 8 A.M. to 5 A.M., with exceptions made only for patients seeking hospital care. A travel ban has also been enforced, particularly affecting young people who must now obtain security clearance to leave the state.

The economic impact of the conflict is palpable in Al-Damazin, where the cost of provisions, vegetables, and other food supplies has skyrocketed. Traders lament the extended distance of the new land

route for transporting goods, which runs from Al-Gadarif, 579 kilometers away, through Sinnar, or from Port Sudan, 1346 kilometers distant. The elongated journey, compounded by costly army checkpoints and the threat of the upcoming rainy season potentially severing the land route, has prompted some traders to consider abandoning the city.

Telecommunications networks, including Zain and MTN, are unstable, and banking services in Al-Damazin operate only partially. The recent plummet in the local currency's exchange rate has led to a dramatic increase in the prices of food commodities. For instance, the price of sugar has reached 200 Sudanese pounds per kilo, while a pound of tea has soared to 7500 Sudanese pounds. The cost of living continues to climb, with the price of a

single piece of bread now at 100 Sudanese pounds.

The healthcare system in Al-Damazin is on the brink of collapse, with health insurance services halted across Sudan due to high levels of indebtedness. Al-Damazin general hospital owes insurance companies 50 billion Sudanese pounds, and with 90% of the population reliant on health insurance, the situation is dire. Only two governmental hospitals—Al-Damazin Royal Hospital and Al-Damazin Military Hospital—and two private hospitals with exorbitant fees remain operational. The scarcity of medical staff and medicine, particularly for cancer and kidney patients, has left many without access to essential care, despite the efforts of charitable organisations and initiatives. 



Al-Fashir: A city wounded by conflict


Atar correspondent

The battle for Al-Fashir has intensified, with RSF and its allied militias determined to seize control of the city, and the joint forces (JPA signed armed movements) equally resolved to repel them. The conflict has resulted in numerous casualties, with exact numbers yet to be determined. Families have been displaced amidst the chaos of battle, from the eastern and northeastern neighborhoods, seeking shelter from the relentless barrage of bullets and artillery shells.

The southern hospital is overwhelmed, unable to accommodate the influx of injured, many of whom are treated and sent home immediately due to space constraints. The authorities, wary of potential threats, have intensified searches in neighborhoods and shelters, setting up checkpoints and instructing local committees to report any unfamiliar faces.

Basic services in Al-Fashir are in cri-

sis, with a severe shortage of running water leading to increased skin infections in the shelters. The main hospital lacks the necessary resources to treat emergencies, particularly during the last three days, which have been marked by fierce clashes in densely populated areas. The rising number of casualties has outstripped the hospital's capacity to provide medical care, prompting volunteers to appeal for support to address the growing health-care deficit.

The cost of consumer goods has doubled, and there is a risk of complete unavailability due to the closure of transportation routes. Fiscal liquidity has all but vanished, with public sector employees' payments suspended and private sector businesses ceasing operations. The only functioning market is Al-Salam weekly market, reliant on traders from the southern part of Al-Fashir for essential goods. However, the presence of RSF and their allies has led to the destruction of villages that once supplied the market with vegetables and fruits, further straining the city's resources. 



Omdurman: The divided city

Atar correspondent

In Omdurman, the official discourse seeks to minimize the areas controlled by the RSF, reducing the sprawling state to a confined section of the city. The army has denied services and restricted the circulation of consumer goods to citizens outside its control, exacerbating their suffering.

The army-controlled area begins at Al-Mohandiseen military base in El-Fitehab and extends across Wad Al-Bashir bridge in Ombada to the north. Parts of Ombada and Omdurman South remain under RSF control, where services cease. Residents are forced to travel great distances to obtain food supplies, such as the west of Jebel Aulia, often facing dangerous roads and predatory checkpoints.

Ombada citizens told Atar that they are prohibited from crossing SAF checkpoints toward Sabrin market, less than 7


kilometres from their residents, so they are forced to travel 120 kilometres to Al-Muthalath area located between three states, North Kordofan, White Nile and Khartoum, via dangerous roads exploited by armed gangs and RSF checkpoints with its members pillaging very often the food supplies they might get.

Prices for essential goods have surged, with a kilo of bread flour costing 8000 Sudanese pounds and cooking oil priced at 4000 Sudanese pounds per local unit. Access to drinking water is a challenge, with a barrel costing 7000 Sudanese pounds as RSF members control the wells.

Citizens face restrictions on movement between neighborhoods, often requiring the accompaniment of an RSF member and written permission to traverse the city. Security forces arrest individuals coming from RSF-controlled areas, with the governor of Khartoum issuing an emergency order to detain and investigate those deemed enemy sympathizers.

Transportation options are limited, with donkey-drawn carts being the primary means of travel for women and the elderly moving between RSF and SAF-controlled areas. Authorities had previously allocated two days per week for citizens to access services in Karari, but this privilege was revoked following the army's control of the national broadcaster and the opening of Al-Mo-

handiseen road, leading to further price hikes.

Telecommunication companies have isolated parts of Omdurman and Ombada, leaving residents reliant on Starlink centers run by RSF members. The people in these closed areas endure oppressive living conditions, with skyrocketing prices and dwindling savings. 



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Dirbis:

*A Canine's tale in
war-torn Nyala*

 By Adam Ibrahim

In the midst of war's chaos, where beauty morphs into brutality, the fate of even the most steadfast companions is uncertain. In Nyala, southern Darfur, a woman named Darelsalam cherished her loyal dog Dirbis, known for his protective nature and exceptional senses.

As violence ravaged society, displacing families and claiming lives, survival became a primal instinct for all creatures, including pets. Trust in humanity dwindled, and Dirbis, along with other dogs, was cast adrift in a world turned hostile.

The aftermath of conflict painted a grim picture: streets lined with the deceased, providing sustenance for scavengers. In time, Dirbis returned to his home, only to find his beloved master had succumbed to the war's toll.

The presence of Dirbis leading a pack of feral dogs sparked a mix of fear and respect among the locals. His fierce loyalty to Darelsalam and the neighborhood remained, as he protected the streets from any threat.

As night fell, the once-familiar lanes of Nyala became the domain of these wild dogs, with Dirbis at the helm, guarding against the encroaching darkness of a world at war.



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